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INTRODUCTION 
Some of America's most successful public companies, including 
Microsoft, Dell, Apple Computer, Intel, Federal Express and Genentech, 
received venture capital financing at various stages of their development 
before going public.1  The post-financing success of these companies has 
                                                          
 1. See NAT'L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS'N, THE VENTURE CAPITAL INDUSTRY:  AN 
OVERVIEW, http://www.nvca.org/def.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2005) [hereinafter THE 
VENTURE CAPITAL INDUSTRY] (noting that by 2000, venture-funded companies that had gone 
public represented over twenty percent of the aggregate number of public firms in the 
United States); William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital 
Organizations, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 473, 482 (1990) (observing that over the last twenty-five 
years, approximately 3,000 companies that have received venture capital financing have 
gone public).  Of the $8.25 trillion total market value of these public companies, venture-
financed firms had a total market value of $2.70 trillion, comprising nearly one-third of the 
total market value of all public companies in the United States.  The Venture Capital 
Industry, supra; see also Once Burnt, Still Hopeful:  Has the Venture-Capital Industry 
Learnt its Lesson?, ECONOMIST, Nov. 27, 2004, 16, 16-18 (“[V]enture capital firms may 
raise as much as $25 billion this year [2004], compared with only $11 billion in 1997.”).  In 
addition, venture-backed firms comprised over eleven percent ($460 billion) and thirteen 
percent ($64.5 billion), respectively, of total sales ($4.19 trillion) and profits ($513 billion) 
of all U.S. public firms in 2000.  The Venture Capital Industry, supra. 
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motivated small, privately-held companies to pursue venture capital 
funding.  For instance, Google Inc. (“Google”), a Silicon Valley search 
engine company, received venture capital financing at several stages of its 
development prior to its initial public offering (“IPO”) in August 2004.2 
Venture capital is independently-managed capital that is invested in 
equity or equity-linked3 securities of privately-held companies.4  An 
interesting question arises when an opportunity to invest venture capital in 
a privately-held company (i.e., Google prior to its IPO) is withheld from a 
potentially interested investor.  Consider the following hypothetical.  
Suppose that ABC LP, a venture capital fund (the “Fund”), and XYZ LLC, 
a professional fund manager (the “Manager”), entered into an agreement to 
co-invest in venture capital start-up companies.  According to the 
agreement, the Manager was responsible to “prospect” and present 
investment opportunities to the Fund.  The agreement granted the Fund a 
right of first refusal—the right to participate in any investment opportunity 
identified by the Manager in advance of all other potential investors and on 
predetermined terms.5  What if during the term of the contract the Manager 
identified an investment opportunity in Google (while still in its early 
stages of development) but breached the contract by failing to present that 
opportunity to the Fund?  Suppose further that as a result of the breach, the 
Fund failed to invest in Google and, accordingly, lost that opportunity to 
participate in Google's remarkable financial success.  What, if any, remedy 
should be given to the Fund for the Manager's breach in failing to present 
                                                          
 2. The Google IPO raised $1.67 billion (the fourth largest IPO of 2004).  Google Inc., 
Prospectus, at 2 (Aug. 18, 2004) [hereinafter Google Prospectus], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/00011931250414337 
7/d424b4.htm.  The year 2004 witnessed the IPOs of sixty-seven venture-funded companies 
for a total of $4.98 billion.  Press Release, VentureOne, IPOs of U.S. Venture-Backed 
Companies Raise $4.98 Billion in 2004 (Jan. 1, 2005), available at 
www.ventureone.com/ii/v1_4Q04_LiquidityPR.pdf.   
 3. See A.B.A. COMM'N ON FED. REG. OF SEC., Report of the Task Force on Regulation 
of Insider Trading, Part II:  Reform of Section 16, 42 BUS. LAW. 1087, 1130 (1987) 
(explaining that equity-linked securities are securities that provide an ownership stake in a 
corporation based upon conversion or exercise of a security or option into the common stock 
of the corporation).  Examples of equity-linked securities are convertible preferred stock, 
convertible debt and warrants.  Id. 
 4. Sahlman, supra note 1, at 482. 
 5. Jonathan F. Mitchell, Can a Right of First Refusal be Assigned?, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 
985, 985 (2001); see also Steinberg v. Sachs, 837 So. 2d 503, 505 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) 
(“A right of first refusal is a right to elect to take specified property at the same price and on 
the same terms and conditions as those continued [sic] in good faith offer by a third person 
if the owner manifests a willingness to accept the offer.” (quoting Coastal Bay Golf Club, 
Inc. v. Holbein, 231 So. 2d 854, 857 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970))); Brian Welding Supply, 
Inc. v. Praxair, Inc., 94-1336 (La. Ct. App. 1995); 654 So. 2d 388, 389-90 (involving right 
of first refusal in sale of a corporation's stock); F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, 
O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 7.5, at 20 (3d ed. 1996 & Supp. 2005) (stating that option 
agreements are the “most common of transfer restrictions” and these often take the form of a 
right of first refusal). 
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the Google investment opportunity to the Fund? 
Significantly, no court has ever determined the appropriate measure of 
damages for the failure to present such an opportunity in the context of 
venture capital investment.  While there is no authority on the issue, the 
law governing damages for breaches of stock and stock option agreements 
provides some guidance on how to resolve the question of damages in the 
Google hypothetical.6 
Part I of the Article provides background on the venture capital industry, 
including a description of the economic impact of the industry in the 
United States and an overview of the industry's organizational 
infrastructure.  Part I also considers the evolving nature of reputation as an 
enforcement mechanism in the venture capital industry and its proper role 
within a legal regime of damages.  Part II sets forth a more detailed account 
of the Google hypothetical.  Using the Google hypothetical as an 
illustration, Part III considers the applicability of the remedial theories of 
conversion, specific performance and expectation damages (each of which 
courts have applied to cases involving breaches of stock or stock option 
agreements) to the breach of the Fund's right of first refusal.  Part IV 
provides a justification for the remedial outcome of the Google 
hypothetical and develops an analytical framework for the consideration of 
breaches of rights of first refusal based on an agency theory of monitoring 
costs.7  Part V considers the desirability and practicability of a liquidated 
damages regime as an alternative to the existing remedial frameworks 
governing breaches of stock and stock option agreements.  Finally, Part V 
proposes a legally supportable methodology for the formulation of a 
liquidated damages clause in the venture capital context and concludes that 
such clauses should become standard in venture capital co-investment 
agreements. 
                                                          
 6. See Steinberg, 837 So. 2d at 505 (distinguishing between the related rights of first 
refusal and options).  By its very nature, a right of first refusal does not contain specific 
terms as to price because the terms necessarily are dictated by the third party offeror whose 
offer the holder of the right is bound to match.  Id.  An option contract, on the other hand, 
“is one in which a seller makes an irrevocable offer to sell on specified terms and which 
creates in a buyer the power of acceptance.”  Id.; accord ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON 
CONTRACTS § 261A (1963).  Whereas a right of first refusal has no binding effect unless the 
offeror decides to sell the property subject to the right, an option compels performance 
within a specified time period, or if no time limit is mentioned, within a reasonable period of 
time.  Steinberg, 837 So. 2d at 505.  A right of first refusal therefore is not an option but 
may ripen into one when an offeror accepts a third party offer.  Id.  At the time of the 
Manager's identification of the Google investment opportunity, the Fund's “right of first 
refusal” matured into an option because the Manager became compelled to perform the 
contract by making an irrevocable offer to sell to the Fund on specified terms the investment 
in Google. 
 7. See infra Part I.C for an introduction into an agency theory of venture capital 
investment. 
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I. THE VENTURE CAPITAL INDUSTRY 
A. The Economic Impact of the Venture Capital Industry                           
in the United States 
The U.S. market for venture capital remained largely unorganized and 
fragmented throughout the late-19th and early-20th centuries.  The first 
modern venture capital firm was established in 1946 when Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT) president Karl Compton, Massachusetts 
Investors Trust chairman Merrill Griswold, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston president Ralph Flanders and Harvard Business School professor 
General Georges F. Doriot formed American Research and Development 
(“ARD”) for the purpose of financing commercial applications of World 
War II technologies.8  The first investment made by ARD was in 1947—a 
$200,000 investment in High Voltage Engineering Company formed by 
several MIT professors to develop X-ray technology for the treatment of 
cancer.9  In an effort to improve its chances of success, ARD assumed an 
active role in the management of High Voltage Engineering Company.10  
When the company went public in 1955, ARD's original $200,000 
investment had appreciated in value to $1.8 million.11  Through its 
investments in young, growth-oriented enterprises and its active 
participation in their management, ARD created the modern paradigm of 
venture capital investment in the United States.12 
Prior to 1980, private equity remained a cottage industry with wealthy 
families and individuals making most of the private equity investments in 
the United States.13  As a result of various regulatory and tax changes, 
including the 1979 amendment to the “prudent man” rule of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”)14 and several 
modifications to the capital gains tax structure,15 private equity became the 
                                                          
 8. See PAUL A. GOMPERS, HARV. BUS. SCH., A NOTE ON THE VENTURE CAPITAL 
INDUSTRY 5 (2001). 
 9. Id. at 6. 
 10. Id. at 5. 
 11. Id. at 6. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Jerry Feigen, Potential Exiting Through ADRs (and/or GDRs?) for 
International Private Equity Investors, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 109, 110 (1997) 
(characterizing venture capital investment as a subset of private equity investment); George 
W. Fenn et al., The Private Equity Market:  An Overview, 4 FIN. MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & 
INSTRUMENTS 1, 2 (1997) (noting that the private equity market is a significant source of 
capital for various types of companies, including start-up firms, private middle-market and 
later-stage firms, firms in financial distress and public firms seeking buyout financing). 
 14. See Haksoo Ko, Venture Capital in Korea?  Special Law to Promote Venture 
Capital Companies, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 457, 461-62 (1999) (discussing the amendment 
to the “prudent man” rule and its impact on venture capital investments). 
 15. Id. at 461.  The enactment of various regulatory and tax changes, including the 1979 
amendment to the “prudent man” rule of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982), and 
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fastest growing market for corporate finance in the United States, 
expanding more rapidly than even the public equity market, the bond 
market and the market for private placement debt.  By 1980, professional 
private equity managers, on behalf of institutional investors, began to 
undertake most of the investment in the private equity market.16  From 
1980 to 1995, the amount of capital managed by the “organized private 
equity market” for venture-financed companies increased from $4.7 billion 
                                                          
several modifications to the capital gains tax structure, including the Tax Reform Act, Pub. 
L. No. 95-600, § 135, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978), the Economic Recovery Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 
97-34, § 101, 95 Stat. 172 (1981), and the Tax Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 301, 100 
Stat. 2085, 2216 (1986), contributed to the growth of the venture capital industry in the 
United States.  See GOMPERS, supra note 8, at 8 (recalling that prior to the amendment to the 
“prudent man” rule, pension funds could allocate only a limited percentage of their assets to 
venture capital investments and other investments in high-risk asset classes).  The 
amendment explicitly permitted pension funds to invest up to ten percent of their funds in 
high-risk asset classes.  Id.  As a result, the annual influx of money into the venture capital 
industry by pension funds increased from an average of $100 to $200 million per year 
during the 1970s to nearly $70 billion per year in 2000.  Id.  In the late 1980s, when 
individuals accounted for thirty-two percent of the participation in the venture capital 
market, pension funds represented only fifteen percent of the participants in the venture 
capital market despite controlling over $3 trillion in funds.  Id.  By 1998, however, pension 
funds accounted for the largest percentage of participation—forty-seven percent—while the 
participation of individuals had declined to eleven percent of the market.  Id. 
The Tax Reform Act of 1978 lowered the capital gains tax to twenty-eight percent 
without changing the top marginal tax rate.  Id.  Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1978, the 
capital gains tax rate was 49.5%, and the maximum marginal tax rate was seventy percent.  
Id.  The difference between the tax rate on capital gains and the highest marginal tax rate on 
normal income thus was 20.5%.  Id.  By lowering the capital gains tax to twenty-eight 
percent, the tax favorability of capital gains increased to forty-two percent.  Id.  The 
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 further reduced the capital gains tax to twenty percent 
but also lowered the maximum marginal tax rate on normal income to fifty percent, thereby 
decreasing the capital gains tax favorability to thirty percent.  Id.  The Tax Reform Act of 
1986 finally eliminated the tax differential between capital gains and normal income.  Id.  
These enactments created incentives for individuals with high taxable income to invest in 
venture capital because gains on such investments are realized principally in the form of 
long-run capital gains.  Id.  Nevertheless, capital gains legislation had only a modest impact 
on the overall money flow into the venture capital industry.  Up to seventy percent of capital 
invested during the 1980s came from tax-exempt sources, such as university endowments, 
trusts, pension funds and foreign companies, for which changes in the tax code had no 
effect.  Id.  Recent capital gains tax legislation under the George W. Bush Administration is 
expected to further contribute to the industry's expansion.  See LATHAM & WATKINS L.L.P., 
JOBS AND GROWTH TAX RELIEF RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2003:  A $350 BILLION TAX RELIEF 
PACKAGE REDUCING INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXES AND PROVIDING TAX RELIEF FOR DIVIDENDS 
AND CAPITAL GAINS (Jan. 6, 2003), 
http://www.lw.com/resource/Publications/ClientAlerts/client 
alert/ (select “Show Client Alerts from 2003” from drop-down list; search for:  “Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act”; then select “Alert No. 299”) (noting that on May 28, 2003, the Jobs 
and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-27, § 105, 117 Stat. 752, 755 
(2003), was enacted, which, inter alia, accelerated previously enacted reductions in 
marginal tax rates and provided for a maximum fifteen percent tax rate on qualified 
dividend income and long-term capital gains). 
 16. GOMPERS, supra note 8, at 8.  See also Fenn, supra note 13, at 2 (referring to the 
limited partnership as the vehicle for organizing this activity, which arose in part from the 
need for greater institutional participation in the industry). 
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to over $175 billion (approximately a 3700% increase).17  During this time, 
small, private companies increasingly started to emerge in the United 
States, reflecting a fundamental shift away from large, public company 
innovation.18  The “innovative fecundity” of these small companies, 
coupled with the increasing institutionalization of private equity 
investment, provided a fertile climate for venture capital growth in the 
United States.19 
By the mid-1980s, returns on venture capital investments began to 
decline because of the influx of inexperienced venture capitalists into the 
market and the saturation of investment in various industries.20  With the 
onset of disappointing returns, investors began to commit less capital to the 
industry.21  By the early 1990s, however, the surge of the IPO market and 
the exit of many inexperienced venture capitalists from the market 
contributed to the reversal of this pattern.22  In fact, new venture capital 
commitments increased twenty-fold from 1991 to 2000.23  At the height of 
the IPO market in 1999 and 2000, venture capital investments achieved 
unprecedented returns of 163% and 209.96%, respectively.24 
                                                          
 17. See Fenn, supra note 13, at 2, 4 (defining the “organized private equity market” as 
professionally managed equity investments in the unregistered securities of private 
companies).  Private equity also encompasses other markets that are distinct and separate 
from the organized market.  Id. at 4.  One such market is the angel capital market.  See id. 
(referring to investments by wealthy individuals in small, closely-held companies).  A third 
market is the informal private equity market.  In this market, unregistered securities are sold 
to institutional investors and accredited individuals.  This market also consists of small 
corporate offering registrations issued directly to the public by small firms that are exempt 
from registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”).  Id.  A fourth 
distinct market is the Rule 144A private equity market.  Id. at 5.  Underwritten private 
equity offerings that are largely bought by the public trading desks of institutional investors 
characterize the Rule 144A market.  Id. 
 18. See PAUL A. GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 326, 326 
(1999) (“The breadth of technology appears wider today than it ever has been before.”). 
 19. Id.; GOMPERS, supra note 8, at 9.  Despite its dramatic growth and increased 
significance for corporate finance in the last two decades, the venture capital market has 
received scant attention in the financial press and scholarly literature.  This lack of attention 
is due in part to the nature of the investment instrument itself.  See Fenn, supra note 13, at 1.  
Private equity securities are exempt from registration with the SEC because they are issued 
in transactions “not involving any public offering.”  15 U.S.C. § 77d(1)-(2) (2000).  The 
non-public nature of these transactions often makes analyzing developments in the industry 
difficult. 
 20. GOMPERS, supra note 8, at 9. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See id. at 3 (recounting that the relationship between IPO market activity and capital 
contributions was largely due to the link between increased investment returns and the 
availability of profitable exit opportunities, i.e., IPOs, for venture capital investments). 
 24. David Rosenberg, The Two “Cycles” of Venture Capital, 28 IOWA J. CORP. L. 419, 
420 (2003); Lisa Bransten, Venture Firms Face Backlash From Investors, WALL ST. J., Apr. 
29, 2002, at C1.  The Cambridge Associates L.L.C. U.S. Venture Capital Index (the 
“Venture Capital Index”) maintains historical returns on venture capital investments.  See, 
e.g., CAMBRIDGE ASSOCS. L.L.C., CAMBRIDGE ASSOCIATES L.L.C. QUARTERLY END-TO-END 
RETURNS (providing quarterly end-to-end returns from 1981 to March 2005) (2005), 
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In 2001, as a result of the collapse of the technology sector, which 
previously had served as the catalyst for the venture capital boom of the 
late 1990s, and the accompanying decline of the IPO market, the venture 
capital market again experienced a detumescence.25  For the year ending 
September 30, 2001, the annual rate of return on venture capital 
investments fell to -47.17% from over 200% in the prior year.26  Although 
the venture capital market continued to decline in the years after 2001, it 
appears recently to have signaled a turn-around.  In 2004, venture capital 
investments totaled $20.9 billion, and the average rate of return reached 
10.12%.27 
As evidenced by its recent resurgence, venture capital will continue to 
play an integral role in U.S. corporate finance.  The magnitude of 
innovative outputs by the industry's entrepreneurial constituency, the 
existence of liquid markets for the achievement of profitable exits28 and the 
willingness of investors and financial intermediaries to work in inherently 
risky climates sustains the venture capital market's viability as a source of 
financing.29 
B. An Overview of the Organizational Infrastructure of Venture Capital 
The venture capital industry's cadre of entrepreneurs is responsible for 
the innovation that drives the investment process.30  Because entrepreneurs 
themselves rarely have the necessary capital to bring their ideas to fruition, 
they rely on venture capital investors for financing.31  Venture capital is a 
                                                          
available at https://www.cambridgeassociates.com/Indexes/VC_Historical_e 
ndtoend_Returns.pdf (providing figures through March 2005).  Each quarter, the Venture 
Capital Index is updated to reflect the net returns on all the U.S. venture capital funds and 
the one, three, five and ten-year rolling return for U.S. venture capital.  Cambridge Assocs. 
L.L.C., Introduction and Methodology, 
https://www.cambridgeassociates.com/Indexes/services_research_proind_vci.asp (last 
visited Sept. 15, 2005). 
 25. See Press Release, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Venture Capital Investing Flat Q4 
2002 (Jan. 28, 2003), available at http://www.pwc.com/gx/eng/main/home/index.h 
tml (click on “Press Room”; select “Press Releases” then “2003 Press Releases”; scroll 
down to “28 January 2003” and select the article) (noting that “[v]enture capital investing 
has continued to decline since the unprecedented run-up that peaked in 2000.”). 
 26. See Small Expectations:  Things are Likely to Get Harder Rather Than Easier, 
ECONOMIST, Nov. 27, 2004, at 9, 9-12 (listing strategies of venture capital investors to make 
money).  
 27. CAMBRIDGE ASSOCS. L.L.C., supra note 24, at 1; CAMBRIDGE ASSOCS. L.L.C. U.S. 
VENTURE CAPITAL INDEX, https://www.cambridgeassociates.com/Indexes/cambridge 
_VC_Index_with_Graph.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2005). 
 28. Venture capital investments typically are exited, or “harvested,” via an IPO. 
 29. See Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market:  Lessons from the 
American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1074 (2003) (stressing the importance of 
venture capital investments' limited duration). 
 30. GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 18, at 3. 
 31. See David Rosenberg, Venture Capital Limited Partnerships:  A Study in Freedom 
of Contract, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 363, 364 (“Entrepreneurs solicit the participation of 
venture capitalists because young companies, particularly those experimenting with high-
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particularly valuable source of financing for high-growth, start-up and 
early-stage companies with limited access to traditional funding 
alternatives.32  Venture capital investors eventually exit, or “harvest,” their 
ownership interests in such companies, either through an IPO or a private 
sale to a third party.33 
Due to the uncertainties surrounding the innovation process,34 the 
volatility of the environment in which start-up companies operate and the 
intangible nature of start-up assets,35 investments in high-technology, start-
up companies are inherently riskier than investments in more established 
companies in mature industries.36  In light of the risks associated with 
financing innovation-intensive companies, a unique organizational pattern 
has evolved in the industry that allows venture capital firms to manage 
portfolios consisting of discrete investments in entrepreneurial enterprises, 
while minimizing some of the inherent risk of venture capital finance.37 
Institutional investors, such as public and corporate pension funds, 
university endowments, investment banks, insurance companies and bank 
                                                          
tech, require a great deal of capital in the months and years before they reach profitability.”). 
 32. GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 18, at 5; see Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal Fairness, 
Strategic Behavior & Venture Survival:  A Theory of Venture Capital-Financed Firms, 2002 
WIS. L. REV. 45, 65 (discussing “staged financing” as a means to partially protect the 
venture capitalist); Jose M. Padilla, What's Wrong with a Washout?:  Fiduciary Duties of 
the Venture Capitalist Investor in a Washout Financing, 1 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 269, 288 
(2001) (highlighting the possible benefits of “washout” techniques in certain 
circumstances). 
 33. Utset, supra note 32, at 111. 
 34. See id. at 58 (concerning, among other things, the technical feasibility and market 
potential of the innovation and the possible emergence of new competition). 
 35. See id. (observing the intangibility in nature of assets of high-technology, start-up 
enterprises, for example, entrepreneur's human capital, patents, and trade secrets).  Firms 
whose primary assets are intangible are riskier to finance than those with tangible assets 
because in the latter investors can recuperate some of their investment by selling tangible 
assets.  Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Robert M. Kossick, Jr. & Julian Fernandez Neckelmann, Structuring Private 
Equity Transactions in Mexico, 6 NAFTA:  L. & BUS. REV. OF THE AM.105, 111 (2000) 
(suggesting private equity investment can be a superior approach to portfolio investment).  
A fund's investments commonly take the form of convertible preferred stock that is either 
convertible into common stock or accompanied by warrants for the purchase of common 
stock.  George G. Triantis, Financial Contract Design in the World of Venture Capital, 68 
U. CHI. L. REV. 305, 312 (2001).  Conversion is triggered by the occurrence of certain 
events such as the successful completion of an IPO.  Id. at 317.  While affording investors 
the benefit of a liquid security that potentially will trade on the public market at an 
appreciated value, convertible preferred stock also provides investors with protection 
against downside risk through redemption, repayment or liquidation preferences.  See 
Richard J. Testa, Massachusetts Business Lawyering:  Venture Capital Financing, § 13.9 
(2003).  Liquidation and redemption preferences enable investors to recapture some of the 
investment in the event the venture fails.  Id.  In the event of liquidation, the preferred stock 
usually has a preference over the common stock to the assets of the corporation.  Accord 
Cannon v. Denver Tramway Corp., 373 A.2d 580, 581-82 (Del. Ch. 1977).  That preference, 
in most instances, equals the original purchase price of the convertible preferred issue plus 
accrued and unpaid dividends.  Id. 
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holding companies, invest their money through financial intermediaries—
limited partnerships typically called “funds”—in which these institutional 
investors serve as passive limited partners.38  The limited partners often 
contribute up to ninety-nine percent of the capital of the fund.39  As 
prescribed by the rules governing limited partnerships, limited partners do 
not assume an active role in the day-to-day management of the fund.40  
Accordingly, limited partners assume liability on any investment only to 
the extent of their capital contribution to the fund.41 
Usually organized as a limited liability company of investment 
professionals, the general partner (“GP”) of the fund is responsible for the 
identification, management and harvest of the fund's investments.42  
Although the GP customarily contributes only one percent of the capital of 
the fund,43 it retains almost complete control over the management of the 
fund.44  The GP receives an annual fixed fee (often called a management 
fee) of between 1.5 and 3 % of the committed capital of the fund.45  The 
GP's compensation is primarily based on variable, performance-related 
fees.46  The variable compensation, called the “carried interest” or “carry,” 
represents the GP's right to receive a specified percentage, which typically 
is twenty percent of the profits realized by the limited partnership.47  While 
                                                          
 38. Gilson, supra note 29, at 1070.  Limited partnerships have a defined, and 
contractually fixed, lifespan, often of ten years, which is renewable in one or two-year 
increments.  See JOSH LERNER & PAUL GOMPERS, HARVARD BUS. SCH., A NOTE ON PRIVATE 
EQUITY PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS 2 (2d ed. 2001).  The limited partnership is the prevalent 
organizational form in the venture capital industry in part because of the tax benefits 
provided by this legal form.  Deborah A. DeMott, Agency and the Unincorporated Firm:  
Reflections on Design on the Same Plane of Interest, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 595, 606 
(1997).  Income from limited partnerships is taxable only to the individual partners; it is not 
subject to partnership-level taxation.  Sahlman, supra note 1, at 482.  In addition, income 
from distributions of securities is recognized as taxable income at the time the underlying 
asset is sold, not at the time the partnership makes a distribution of securities to the limited 
partners.  Id. at 489. 
 39. Rosenberg, supra note 31, at 366. 
 40. Gilson, supra note 29, at 1070. 
 41. Kossick, Jr. & Neckelmann, supra note 37, at 111. 
 42. Gilson, supra note 29, at 1071. 
 43. LERNER & GOMPERS, supra note 38, at 1. 
 44. See Gilson, supra note 29, at 1071 (discussing the issue of the emergence of the 
separation between ownership and control of the modern corporation as raised in ADOLF A. 
BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 
(1932)). 
 45. See Gilson, supra note 29, at 1072 (characterizing the compensation as “skewed”); 
GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 18, at 10, 70 (discussing committed capital, which is the 
amount of money investors commit to provide over the life of a fund).  Less frequently, the 
management fee consists of a specified percentage of the fund's assets or some combination 
or modification of both the committed capital and asset value formulae.  Id.  During the 
internet bubble, the management fee increased in some instances to as high as 3.5% of the 
committed capital of the fund.  Rosenberg, supra note 24, at 420. 
 46. Gilson, supra note 29, at 1071-72. 
 47. Id. at 1072.  During the peak of the internet bubble, the “carry” rose to as high as 
thirty percent.  Rosenberg, supra note 24, at 420 n.7; Highly Leveraged:  A Gravity-Defying 
Pay Structure, ECONOMIST, Nov. 27, 2004, at 8, 8 (reporting that the “general partners who 
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incentive-based compensation structures inure to the benefit of limited 
partners by motivating appropriate effort levels on the part of GPs, such 
incentive structures are also advantageous to GPs.48  A GP's explicit 
acceptance of a “pay-for-performance” compensation scheme signals 
confidence in its ability to create value in an investment, thereby attracting 
more investors to existing funds, facilitating future fundraising efforts and 
enhancing its reputational value in the industry.49 
Many venture capital funds also have a professional fund manager who 
is neither a general nor a limited partner of the fund.50  The fund 
manager—a separate (and often affiliated) entity usually organized as a 
limited liability company—provides investment guidance and other 
administrative services to the fund.51  In addition to general advisory 
services, the fund manager may be responsible to prospect and identify 
investment opportunities for the fund.52  Pursuant to a right of first refusal, 
the fund may have the opportunity to co-invest with the manager in an 
identified investment opportunity up to a predetermined percentage.53  For 
its advisory and prospecting services, the fund pays the manager an annual 
management fee.54  This fee often represents a specified percentage of the 
amounts the fund invests in an identified investment opportunity.55 
Both the liability limitations for limited partners and the incentive-based 
compensation structures (i.e., the “carry”) for GPs shift some of the risks 
associated with venture capital finance from limited partner investors to 
GPs.56  In addition to the organizational infrastructure that provides for the 
shifting of risk internally within the fund, a number of mechanisms have 
evolved in the industry that permit funds to transfer and/or share risk with 
other funds or with the entrepreneurial companies they finance.  For 
instance, a number of venture capital funds simultaneously may participate 
                                                          
manage private-equity funds are lavishly paid”). 
 48. Gilson, supra note 29, at 1078. 
 49. See LERNER & GOMPERS, supra note 38, at 6. 
 50. See Woodrow W. Campbell, Jr. & Paul S. Bird, Private Equity:  Current Topics, 
1393 PRAC. L. INST. CORP. & PRAC. HANDBOOK SERIES 7, 19 (2003) (discussing the role of 
the manager of a private equity fund in the United States). 
 51. Id. 
 52. See id. at 15 (“[T]he professional fund manager has learned to be ruthlessly 
selective.  He or she quickly picks from the flow of opportunities the very few that have 
high appeal, and then further eliminates all but the most compelling opportunities.  By being 
so selective and disciplined, the fund manager has made a major contribution to innovation 
by focusing available resources behind the very best concepts and limiting the dissipation of 
money and energy on superficially attractive but low-probability outcomes.”). 
 53. See Mitchell, supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 54. Campbell, Jr. & Bird, supra note 50, at 19 (providing a sample investment fund 
manager's agreement). 
 55. See JAMES M. SCHELL, PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS:  BUSINESS STRUCTURES AND 
OPERATIONS, at App. E (2004) (providing a sample agreement). 
 56. Gilson, supra note 29, at 1078. 
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in an investment.57  The syndication of an investment through the 
participation of several funds facilitates the selection of superior 
investments, provides more capital availability for the current and follow-
on cash needs of an investment and enhances opportunities for 
diversification, all while leveraging the expertise of additional market 
participants.58  Furthermore, unlike banks, which disburse borrowed money 
in a single tranche, funds typically mete out capital infusions in stages.59  
To receive a subsequent round of financing, the portfolio company 
generally must meet specified goals such as the completion of product 
development, the attainment of profitability or the pursuit of an IPO or 
other viable exit strategy.60  By disbursing funds only when predetermined 
milestones have been achieved, staged financing provides investors with 
the flexibility to abandon underperforming projects or to increase their 
investments in viable projects by participating in subsequent rounds of 
financing.61 
C. An Agency Theory of Venture Capital Investment 
The organizational infrastructure of venture capital described above 
points to the salience of agency theory as a basis for understanding the 
nature of venture capital investment.  Whenever one individual acts on 
behalf of another, a potential agency problem arises:  the agent (the person 
acting on behalf of another) may have interests that are incongruous with 
those of its principal.62  In venture capital, there are a number of 
                                                          
 57. Id. at 1073; GOMPERS, supra note 8, at 14. 
 58. GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 18, at 187. 
 59. See id. at 139. 
 60. Id. at 142; Sahlman, supra note 1, at 482; see Shannon Wells Stevenson, The 
Venture Capital Solution to the Problem of Close Corporation Shareholder Fiduciary 
Duties, 51 DUKE L.J. 1139, 1173 (2001) (listing factors peculiar to venture capital that may 
account for a lack of litigation in the field).  Apple Computer and Federal Express are 
examples of venture-funded companies that received staged financing.  See GOMPERS & 
LERNER, supra note 18, at 142 (detailing the relation between venture capitalists’ financial 
investments and the success of the firm at each periodic investment stage).  Apple Computer 
received three rounds of financing.  Id.  Venture capitalists invested $518,000 in January 
1978 at a price of $0.09 per share.  Id.  Due to initial successes, the company received an 
additional $704,000 at a price of $0.28 per share during the second round of financing.  Id.  
In December 1980, investors made a final capital infusion of $2.331 million at $0.97 per 
share, which reflected further progress made by the young company and optimism regarding 
Apple Computer's prospects.  Id.  Federal Express also received three rounds of financing.  
Unlike Apple Computer, however, each round did not signal the increased success of the 
company.  During the first round of financing in September 1973, venture capitalists 
invested $12.25 million at a price per share of $204.17.  Id.  By the time of the second round 
of financing in March 1974, the company's performance had fallen below expectations, and 
investors expressed their uncertainty over the company's prospects by investing only $6.4 
million at a price per share of $7.34.  Id.  In September 1974, Federal Express received its 
final round of funding in the amount of $3.88 million priced at $0.63 per share.  Id.  By 
1978, Federal Express's performance had improved, and it went public at $6 per share.  Id. 
 61. Gilson, supra note 29, at 1080. 
 62. Utset, supra note 32, at 55. 
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relationships that follow the agency paradigm, including the GP/limited 
partner, entrepreneur/fund and fund/manager relationships. 
Inherent in any agency relationship are informational asymmetries 
between the principal and the agent.  As monitoring costs—that is, 
informational costs—increase, an agent will have more opportunities to 
take actions that are detrimental to its principal.63  For instance, as a result 
of its prospecting activities, a fund manager may procure significant 
informational advantages over the fund(s) it manages regarding existing or 
prospective investment opportunities.  When a fund's informational 
disadvantage increases, and accordingly, its monitoring costs rise, the 
potential for managerial opportunism also increases.  The Google 
hypothetical set forth in Part II presents an illustrative example of 
managerial opportunism in the context of venture capital investment. 
Mitigating against the informational asymmetries between principals and 
agents and the potential opportunism arising therefrom is the reputational 
constraint mechanism.  The following section considers the evolving nature 
of reputation as an enforcement mechanism in the venture capital industry 
and its proper role within a legal regime of damages. 
D. The Reputational Constraint Mechanism 
The importance of reputation arises from two sources:  (1) the possibility 
of repeat transactions with current business associates and (2) the potential 
for the development of new business relationships as a result of market 
participants' exchanges of information.64  Apart from the law's remedial 
framework for breaches of contract, the value of lost future transactions 
encourages parties to perform their contracts.65  Although its effectiveness 
in the enforcement of contractual performance is not susceptible to 
empirical proof, reputation bears a strong relationship to a person's decision 
not to breach a contract.66 
Enhancing the potency of the reputational constraint mechanism is the 
uniquely cyclical nature of venture capital investment.67  The venture 
                                                          
 63. Id. 
 64. See Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance:  Toward a Unified 
Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341, 347 (1984) (claiming reputation is 
likely the most important “nonlegal market force”). 
 65. Id. at 347-48. 
 66. Id. at 347. 
 67. See Rosenberg, supra note 31, at 395 (contrasting the investment protection 
mechanisms of venture capital partnership investors, who rely almost exclusively on 
reputational constraints, with corporate shareholders, who leverage control through voting, 
buying and selling stock, and bringing derivative actions to enforce their rights); Triantis, 
supra note 37, at 320 (suggesting that because the time required to acquire requisite skills 
and track record limits the supply of venture capitalists, an increase in demand among 
investors would improve the bargaining power of venture capitalists and cause a significant 
short-run increase in their returns). 
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capital market consists of a predictable and regular cycle through which 
GPs and/or fund managers return to the same investors upon the 
completion of a prior round of investment.68  Characterized by Black and 
Gilson as “an implicit contract in which capital providers are expected to 
reinvest in future limited partnerships sponsored by successful venture 
capital funds,”69 this agreement forms the basis for the cyclicality of 
venture capital investment.70 The prospect of renewing existing 
relationships thus promotes bilateral adherence to the reputational 
constraint mechanism.71 
Further strengthening the efficacy of reputation as an enforcement 
mechanism is the industry's concentration of capital and stratification of 
managerial talent.72  The concentration of capital in the hands of relatively 
few investors incentivizes both GPs and fund managers to perform their 
contracts to obtain financing for future investments.73  Similarly, the 
potential to cultivate relationships with the industry's managerial talent and 
thereby participate in the industry's meritorious enterprises promotes 
investor adherence to the reputational constraint mechanism.74 
These attributes (i.e., cyclicality of investment, concentration of capital 
                                                          
 68. See Rosenberg, supra note 24, at 424 (explaining that the desire to continue the 
relationship encourages GPs and investors to act in good faith and avoid extreme measures, 
such as litigation). 
 69. Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital 
Markets:  Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 256 (1998). 
 70. See Gilson, supra note 29, at 1071 (explaining the common practice where GPs 
begin soliciting investors for a new fund by the mid-point of the existing fund's 
contractually fixed term); see also Rosenberg, supra note 31, at 397 (noting that “as the 
venture capitalists gain experience, initially at some cost to the investors, the value of their 
services to those same investors increases, making them more likely to join a future limited 
partnership”); Triantis, supra note 37, at 320 (observing that the venture capital sector is 
“significantly segmented by the size, industry focus, location, and reputation of venture 
capitalists”). 
 71. See Rosenberg, supra note 24, at 425 (“Even though the investors and limited 
partners are only legally committed to each other for the duration of the current fund, the 
success of both parties' long-term commitment to investment in venture capital depends on 
their having the confidence that the relationship will in fact continue for years, through the 
creation of new venture capital limited partnerships involving the same parties.”). 
 72. See Rosenberg, supra note 31, at 395 (explaining that a successful venture capital 
firm is “plainly one to which investors return again and again following the creation and 
subsequent profitable liquidation of a limited partnership”); Triantis, supra note 37, at 320 
(stating that VCs are compensated through both their contractual share of portfolio profits 
and the nonmonetary private benefits extracted from the partnership). 
 73. See Rosenberg, supra note 31, at 395 (suggesting that the “short life of limited 
partnerships virtually guarantees that the venture capitalists will undergo a 'periodic review' 
at the hands of their current investors who are, inevitably, potential future investors as 
well”); see also Triantis, supra note 37, at 315 (stating that “the relationship of the parties 
and the intermediaries' concern with their reputations are crucial constraints against 
opportunistic behavior”). 
 74. See Rosenberg, supra note 24, at 424-25 (explaining how highly successful venture 
capitalists are able to dictate the terms of the limited partnership agreements governing their 
relationships with investors, retain virtually all of the decision-making power, and insist on 
increasingly better terms of remuneration for themselves). 
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and stratification of management talent) historically have made litigation a 
rare occurrence in the venture capital industry.75  Recent anecdotal 
evidence, however, points to a trend toward an increase in litigation in the 
industry.76  Beyond the obvious incentives for litigation arising out of the 
poor investment returns of recent years, the gradual fragmentation of the 
venture capital market resulting from the participation of an increasing 
number of entrepreneurs, investors and managers has diminished the 
importance of relationships, and accordingly, the efficacy of reputation 
both as an enforcement mechanism and as a constraint to litigation.77 
As the market continues to mature, more litigation is inevitable.78  In 
light of this evolving legal landscape, the resolution of the damages issue 
raised in this Article is of particular salience.  Part II sets forth a more 
detailed account of the Google hypothetical and is followed by an analysis 
of the legal frameworks of several remedial theories as well as a 
consideration of their applicability to the breach of the Fund's right of first 
refusal. 
II.  THE GOOGLE HYPOTHETICAL 
Suppose that, in 1998, the Fund and the Manager entered into a non-
exclusive agreement pursuant to which the Manager was required to 
present to the Fund all investment opportunities the Manager identified 
during a two-year period (1998-99).  The Fund, in turn, had a right of first 
refusal on those investments identified by the Manager during the stated 
term of the contract.79  For each investment opportunity, the Fund's right of 
first refusal entitled it to participate in such an opportunity up to fifty 
                                                          
 75. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter?  A Study of Settlements in 
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 571 (1991) (stating that sophisticated 
investors, such as those who invest in venture capital partnerships or established companies, 
do not generally sue if things turn out badly unless there is strong evidence of fraud). 
 76. See Noram Alster, What's that Rumble in Venture Capital Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
3, 2002, § 3, at 4 (pointing to poor performance, high management fees, and a desire to 
recover losses as factors creating tension between GPs and investors after a period of strong 
returns and little friction during the 1980s and 1990s); Gary Rivlin, The Founders of Web 
Site Accuse Backers of Cheating Them, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2005, at C15 (chronicling a 
case filed in January 2005 in the Superior Court of California involving a dispute between a 
group of investors and its venture capital sponsors). 
 77. See Alster, supra note 76, at §§ 3, 4 (“An outbreak of litigation in this relatively 
closed world is one clear sign of investor frustration over the tens of billions of dollars that 
have been committed but not put to use.”). 
 78. See Robert Chow, Holy Grail Proves Elusive for VCs, FIN. TIMES Mar. 26, 2002, at 
26 (chronicling reports of failed venture capital investments, uncommitted fund capital, and 
management agreement disputes); Beth Healy, Threat of Lawsuits Has Firms Seeking 
Insurance Coverage, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 26, 2002, at C2 (quoting Carl Metzger, who 
stated “[t]he new litigation landscape that's out there for VCs is not just a function of the 
economic environment, but a function of the growth of the industry.”). 
 79. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (defining the right of first refusal as the 
right to participate in any investment opportunity identified by the Manager in advance of 
all other potential investors and on predetermined terms). 
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percent of the amounts that the Manager elected to invest in the 
opportunity.  In return for the Manager's prospecting services, the Fund 
would pay two percent of any amounts the Fund invested in an investment 
opportunity as a fee to the Manager. 
Suppose further that in February 1999, the Manager identified an 
investment opportunity in Google, a privately-held search engine company 
formed in 1998 by two Stanford University students.80  After evaluating the 
opportunity, in June 1999, the Manager decided to invest $5 million in 
Google, reflecting an eight percent ownership stake in the company.81  In 
breach of the Fund's right of first refusal, the Manager failed to present to 
the Fund the opportunity to co-invest in fifty percent of the Manager's $5 
million investment (or $2.5 million, representing a four percent ownership 
interest in Google).82 
Recognizing Google's potential for success, the Manager invested an 
additional $7.6 million in December 2000,83 which as of December 2000, 
represented an additional 1.5 % ownership stake.84  At that time, the 
Manager's prior $5 million investment, or eight percent ownership interest, 
had increased in value to $40.534 million (an approximately 800% 
increase).85  Had the Manager presented to the Fund the Google investment 
                                                          
 80. See Press Release, Google Inc., Google Receives $25 Million in Equity Funding 
(June 7, 1999) (on file with the American University Law Review) (providing the basis for 
this hypothetical, where Google received $25 million in equity financing from a group of 
investors led by Sequoia Capital and Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers in June 1999); see 
also Verne Kopytoff & Dan Fost, For Early Googlers, Key Word is $$$:  Founders, 
Backers Could Reap Billions When Company Goes Public, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 29, 2004, at 
A1, A14 (estimating that Sequoia Capital and Kleiner Perkin Caufield & Byers' $25 million 
investment represented a forty percent ownership share in Google). 
 81. See infra note 83 (supplying this hypothetical's basis, which assumes that Sequoia 
Capital and Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers syndicated their $25 million investment by 
taking twenty percent of the syndicate's investment in Google ($5 million representing an 
eight percent ownership interest in Google)). 
 82. See infra notes 83-84 (providing the basis for this hypothetical, which assumes that 
under the co-investment agreement, the Manager was required to present to the Fund fifty 
percent of any investment it made in an opportunity the Manager identified (fifty percent of 
the Manager's $5 million investment in Google, representing an eight percent ownership 
interest in the company, is $2.5 million, reflecting a four percent ownership interest in 
Google)). 
 83. See Dan Primack, PE Week Wire, PRIVATE EQUITY WK., Aug. 20, 2004, available at 
http://www.privateequityweek.com/pew/freearticles/1070550169239.html (indicating that 
Sequoia Capital and Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers invested an additional $15.18 million 
in Google in late 2000 at a post-money valuation of approximately $445 million and 
representing approximately a three percent ownership interest in Google). 
 84. See id. (applying the additional $15.18 million investment to the hypothetical 
numbers ($7.6 million) reduces the investment by fifty percent reflecting a 1.5% ownership 
interest; according to the hypothetical, the Manager's December 2000 investment fell 
outside the coverage period of the co-investment agreement (1998-99), and as a result, the 
Manager had no contractual obligation to provide the Fund with an opportunity to 
participate in this latter investment). 
 85. See supra notes 83-85 (deriving the December 2000 investment value given that 
1.5% of Google was worth $7.6 million in December 2000, eight percent of Google was 
worth $40.534 million, and four percent was worth $20.267 million at the time). 
COSENZA OFFTOPRINTER 2/24/2006  1:33:57 PM 
2005] CO-INVEST AT YOUR OWN RISK 103 
opportunity—as it was contractually obligated to do in June 1999—the 
Fund's allocable $2.5 million investment, or four percent ownership 
interest, would have been worth $20.267 million by December 2000.86 
From 2000 to 2004, Google experienced tremendous success.87  On 
April 29, 2004, Google announced that it had filed a registration statement 
with the SEC for a proposed IPO of its Class A common stock.88  
Subsequently, on August 18, 2004, Google's IPO was priced at $85/share, 
and 19.6 million shares were issued, which represented 7.23% of the 
company.89  Pursuant to this valuation, as of August 18, 2004, the 
Manager's eight percent ownership interest had risen in value to $1.848 
billion (an approximately 360,000% increase), while the Fund's allocable 
four percent ownership interest would have been worth $924 million (an 
approximately 180,000% increase).90 
Google went public on August 19, 2004.91  Its closing stock price on the 
first day of trading was $100.34/share.92  The following chart sets forth 
                                                          
 86. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text (calculating the valuation of the 
Fund's potential investment if Manager had adhered to the traditional reputational constraint 
mechanism). 
 87. See Google Inc., Google Corporate Information:  Google History, 
http://www.google.com/corporate/history.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2005) (chronicling 
Google's expansion into new services and technologies, which included the Google 
Directory, global partnerships, wireless search capability, Google Image Search, Google 
Labs, Google News, Froogle, Blogger and Gmail). 
 88. Press Release, Google Inc., Google Inc. Files Registration with the SEC for an 
Initial Public Offering (Apr. 29, 2004), available at http://www.google.com/press/pr 
essrel/reg_statement.html. 
 89. Google Prospectus, supra note 2; Press Release, Google Inc., Google Inc. Prices 
Initial Public Offering of Class A Common Stock (Aug. 18, 2004), available at 
http://www.google.com/press/pressrel/ipo.html; see Press Release, Google Inc., Google Inc. 
Requests Effectiveness of IPO Registration Statement (Aug. 18, 2004), available at 
http://www.google.com/pres/pressrel/reg2_statement.html (announcing decision to lower 
both the offering price and the issuance's number of shares to 19.7 million shares (of its 
271.2 million shares outstanding)); see also Matthew Fordahl, Google Price Set at $85, at 
Low End of Company's Expectations, S.F. GATE.COM (Aug. 18, 2004), available at 
http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?file 
=/news/archive/2004/08/18/financial2112EDT0223.DTL&type=business (explaining that 
the $85 price “values the world's most popular search engine at $23.1 billion”). Google 
initially planned to issue 25.7 million shares at a price per share of between $108 and $135.  
Google's market capitalization at the time of the IPO is calculated by multiplying the 
number of outstanding shares by the share offering price (271,219,243 shares x $85/share), 
which equals $23.1 billion.  From the IPO, Google raised $1.674 billion (price per share 
($85) multiplied by the number of shares issued (19,695,052)). 
 90. See supra note 89 (calculating the amount of capital raised in the IPO, given that 
7.23% of Google was worth $1.674 billion at the time of the IPO, eight percent of Google 
was worth $1.848 billion and four percent of the company was worth $924 million). 
 91. See Gary Rivlin, Unorthodoxy Pushed Aside, Google Opens with Run-Up, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 20, 2004, at C1 (reporting on Google's first day of trading where Google stock 
was bought and sold at a rapid rate, which Google had tried to avoid by using an online 
auction to attract bidders who would buy the stock as a long-term investment). 
 92. See id. (reporting that Google's price at the end of its first day of trading was 
eighteen percent higher than its release price, which gave Google a market valuation of 
more than $27 billion). 
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Google's stock price on various dates from the date of its IPO to the date of 
the Fund's lawsuit. 
Figure 2.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As indicated by Figure 2.1, Google's stock price continued to rise in the 
wake of its IPO, reaching $190.64/share on October 31, 2004.93  On that 
date, the Manager sold its investment in Google and made a profit on the 
sale of approximately $2 billion.  Upon learning of the sale, the Fund sued 
for breach of the right of first refusal on October 31, 2004 and sought 
damages of approximately $2 billion or, in the alternative, specific 
performance of its contract with the Manager.94 
                                                          
 93. See Andrei Postelnicu, Blue-Chips Hold Steady With All Eyes on Rates, FIN. TIMES, 
Nov. 11, 2004, at 30 (reporting that Google's stock price decreased slightly based on news 
that Microsoft planned to preview a competing search service). 
 94. The Fund calculated its damages by valuing what its investment in Google would 
have been worth on October 31, 2004.  Based on the IPO allocations, 10,843,706 shares 
represented a four percent ownership stake in Google.  As of October 31, 2004, Google's 
stock price was $190.64/share.  Thus, 10,843,706 shares (four percent of Google's stock) 
multiplied by $190.64 (the price/share) less $2.5 million (the cost of the Fund's investment 
in Google had it been permitted to invest in Google) equals $2,064,744,111.84. 
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III.  POSSIBLE REMEDIES FOR BREACHES OF RIGHTS OF FIRST REFUSAL 
A. Conversion Theory 
The first (and potentially most lucrative) theory of recovery for the Fund 
lies in conversion.  The modern action for the tort of conversion descended 
from the common law action of trover.95  Traditionally based on the theory 
that a finder of lost goods has a duty to return them to their rightful owner, 
trover was eventually extended to cases of dispossession, or of withholding 
possession, by others than finders of lost goods.96  Trover became a 
universal remedy for deprivations of chattel (personal property), whether 
by wrongful taking, wrongful detention, wrongful disposal or other 
interference with the chattel.97  The modern-day definition of conversion 
imposes a duty on individuals not to engage in the “unauthorized and 
wrongful exercise of dominion and control over another's personal 
property.”98  While the tort historically did not encompass intangible 
personal property, courts have expanded the cause of action to apply to 
certain types of intangible property, including stocks and bonds.99 
For contracts involving stocks and bonds, courts endorsing the use of 
conversion apply no fewer than seven methods for calculating damages.100  
                                                          
 95. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A (1965) (stating that “conversion is 
an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes 
with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other 
the full value of the chattel”). 
 96. See id. (explaining that the fiction of losing and finding persisted until 
comparatively recent times in many jurisdictions in the pleading of the action). 
 97. See id. (explaining that because of its use as a universal remedy, conversion was not 
clearly distinguished from the action of trespass). 
 98. Phansalkar v. Andersen Weinroth & Co., 175 F. Supp. 2d 635, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(quoting Pioneer Commercial Funding Corp. v. United Airlines, Inc., 122 B.R. 871, 883 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991)). 
 99. See id. (quoting In re Chateaugay Corp., 156 B.R. 391, 400 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1993)) (confirming that New York has “extended the tort of conversion to intangible 
property rights that are 'merged in, or identified with, some document' or 'relate to 
specifically identifiable money.'“).  See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 15, at 90-92 (5th ed. 1984) (chronicling the expansion of 
the theory of conversion, which has stopped short of finding conversion of an ordinary debt, 
the goodwill of a business, an idea, or “any species of personal property which is the subject 
of private ownership,” despite the lack of a valid or essential reason for this limitation). 
 100. See Royce de R. Barondes, An Alternative Paradigm for Valuing Breach of 
Registration Rights and Loss of Liquidity, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 627, 636-39 (2005) 
(identifying the seven different measures as:  (1) the value of the stock at the time of the 
conversion; (2) the highest value of the stock from the time of the conversion to a 
reasonable period of time thereafter; (3) the highest value of the stock between the time of 
the conversion and a reasonable time after the owner's notice of the conversion; (4) the 
highest value of the stock from the time the owner has notice of the conversion to a 
reasonable period thereafter; (5) the higher of the value of the stock at the time of the 
conversion and the highest value of the stock from the time the owner has notice of the 
conversion to a reasonable period of time thereafter; (6) the highest value of the stock from 
the time of the conversion until the time of the lawsuit; and (7) the highest value of the stock 
from the time of the conversion until the time of the trial or the time a verdict is issued). 
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A majority of courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court in Galigher v. 
Jones, has measured conversion damages by taking the highest value of the 
stock between the date of the conversion and a reasonable period of time 
after the owner's notice of the conversion.101  The proposition underlying 
conversion theory is that the breaching party should assume the risk of 
market fluctuation until the injured party can enter the market and replace 
the converted shares.102  Although the Galigher Court did not require the 
injured party actually to reenter the market, it discussed market reentry 
only to establish the outer time limit of a reasonable period during which 
“the highest intermediate value” of the lost stock could be ascertained.103  
In Galigher, a case involving a broker's failure to purchase shares of stock 
at his customer's instruction as well as the broker's unauthorized sale of 
other shares held by his customer, the Supreme Court reasoned that using 
the conversion measurement of damages in cases involving stock (a good 
with oscillating market value) would allow a plaintiff to recover profits 
possibly lost as a result of the conversion.104 
Courts have not developed consistent rules governing what constitutes a 
“reasonable period” of time after the injured party's notice of the 
conversion.105  However, as the Galigher Court emphasized, courts have 
attempted to define a “reasonable period” as the time frame during which 
the plaintiff could have accomplished a commercially reasonable substitute 
transaction.106  In attempting to resolve this inquiry, courts consider a 
number of factors, including the amount of securities to be purchased by 
                                                          
 101. See Galigher v. Jones, 129 U.S. 193, 200 (1889) (“[T]he measure of damages . . . is 
the highest intermediate value reached by the stock between the time of the wrongful act 
complained of and a reasonable time thereafter . . . .”). 
 102. See id. (explaining the measure of damages to allow “the party injured to place 
himself in the position he would have been in had not his rights been violated”). 
 103. Id.; see Schultz v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 716 F.2d 136, 140 (2d Cir. 
1983) (citing Galigher, 129 U.S. at 201) (explaining that in a volatile market allowing the 
injured party “merely the value of the stock at the time of conversion would provide an 
inadequate and unjust remedy”); see also Scully v. US WATS, Inc., 238 F.3d 497, 514 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (quoting Schultz, 716 F.2d at 140) (noting that requiring actual reentry into the 
market would increase the risk to plaintiff because such a rule does not account for the 
possibility of unfavorable market conditions, which “would frustrate the rule which seeks to 
make an investor whole”).  But see 11 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER 
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5117 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2003) 
(“The general rule for conversion damages is that the value of the property is to be 
determined as of the date of the conversion.”). 
 104. See Galigher, 129 U.S. at 200 (“The real injury sustained by the principal 
consists . . . in the sale of [the stock] at an unfavorable time, and for an unfavorable price.”). 
 105. See Schultz, 716 F.2d at 140 (explaining that “what constitutes a reasonable period 
between the act complained of and the time when reentry into the market would be both 
warranted and possible will vary from case to case”). 
 106. See Galigher, 129 U.S. at 200 (distinguishing stocks, for which the market is 
volatile, from other goods, which are “generally supposed to have a fixed market value at 
which they can be replaced at any time”); de R. Barondes, supra note 100, at 648 (stating 
that “[t]he courts have not developed firm rules governing what constitutes a 'reasonable 
period.'“). 
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the plaintiff and the liquidity (or illiquidity) of the relevant market.107  
Depending on the factual circumstances, courts have found that ten days, 
one month, two months or more constituted a “reasonable period.”108 
Even small changes in the court's selection of a “reasonable period” of 
time after the owner's receipt of notice may result in vastly different 
damages outcomes, particularly in cases involving assets with fluctuating 
values.109  Applying the Galigher measure of damages, the following chart 
sets forth a number of possible damages outcomes in the Google 
hypothetical on various dates from the date of the breach to the date of the 
lawsuit.  Based on the court's assessment of a “reasonable period” of time 
following the Fund's receipt of notice of the conversion, these damages 
could range from $0 to $2,064,744,111. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1                                                                                              
Damages Calculations: Conversion 
 
Description Calculation Total 
June 30, 1999—Date 
of Breach (Date of 
First Investment by 
Manager) 
$2.5 milion (4% 
ownership stake in 
Google) less $2.5 million 
$0 
December 31, 2000—
Date of Second 
Investment by 
Manager 
$20.267 million (4% 
ownership stake in 
Google) less $2.5 million 
$17,767,000 
August 19, 2004—
Google Traded 
10,843,706 shares (4% 
ownership stake in 
$1,291,804,748 
                                                          
 107. See de R. Barondes, supra note 100, at 648 (“If the reasonable period is designed to 
reflect the time period in which one could make a commercially reasonable sale, that time 
period would be based on a number of factors, including the amount of securities to be sold 
and the liquidity of the market . . . .”). 
 108. See Commonwealth Assocs. v. Palomar Med. Techs. (Palomar), 982 F. Supp. 205, 
211-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (indicating that where the availability of a market has not been 
proven, a year or more may be a reasonable time period under the highest intermediate value 
test); Madison Fund, Inc. v. Charter Co., 427 F. Supp. 597, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) 
(concluding that two months was a reasonable period); TheraTX, Inc. v. Duncan, 775 A.2d 
1019, 1023 (Del. 2001) (affirming that ten days can constitute a reasonable period under the 
highest intermediate value test). 
 109. de R. Barondes, supra note 100, at 648. 
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Publicly Google) 
($100.34/share)less $2.5 
million 
September 20, 2004—
30 Days After Google 
Goes Public 
10,843,706 shares (4% 
ownership stake in 
Google) 
($119.36/share)less $2.5 
million 
$1,291,804,748 
October 31, 2004—
Date of the Fund’s 
Lawsuit 
10,843,706 shares (4% 
ownership stake in 
Google) 
($190.64/share)less $2.5 
million 
$2,064,744,111 
 
Before deciding which, if any, of these damages outcomes is appropriate 
for the breach of the Fund's right of first refusal, this Article next examines 
the legal framework of a cause of action in conversion to determine 
whether its application is warranted under the factual circumstances of the 
Google hypothetical. 
1. The legal framework of conversion 
a. Establishing a cause of action for conversion 
To establish a cause of action in conversion, plaintiffs must prove (1) 
their “legal ownership or an immediate, superior possessory right of 
possession to a specific identifiable thing” that is merged in, or identified 
with, some document, or relates to specifically identifiable money and (2) 
that the defendant wrongfully assumed unauthorized control and dominion 
over the property in question.110 
Proving the first element of a cause of action in conversion has been the 
subject of some legal debate.  For example, in Weiss v. Leewards Creative 
Crafts, Inc., Kenneth M. Weiss, the plaintiff, alleged that the defendants—
Leewards (the issuing corporation), its selling stockholders, underwriters 
and individual directors—converted Leewards stock by not delivering 1000 
shares of Leewards stock that Weiss had agreed to purchase at a future 
public offering.111  The Leewards stock was not delivered because the stock 
issuance was cancelled.112  Even assuming that Weiss had some cognizable 
                                                          
 110. Phansalkar v. Andersen Weinroth & Co., 175 F. Supp. 2d 635, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001); Calabrese Found. v. Inv. Advisors, 831 F. Supp. 1507, 1515 (D. Colo. 1993); Weiss 
v. Leewards Creative Crafts, Inc. (Leewards), No. 12,384, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 73, at *16 
(Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 1993). 
 111. Leewards, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 73, at *3, *4. 
 112. Id. 
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property right in Leewards stock, the Delaware Court of Chancery found 
that Weiss had failed to demonstrate his right to possess the Leewards 
stock as a matter of law.113  In reaching this conclusion, the Court pointed 
to Leewards' final prospectus, which unambiguously stated that the 
purchase of the company's stock was “conditionally sold on a 'when-issued' 
basis.”114  The Court determined that because the stock was never issued, 
Weiss was precluded from claiming a superior, possessory interest in the 
stock.115 
The Leewards analysis calls into question the Fund's ability to prove 
either of the requisite elements of a cause of action in conversion.  Unlike 
Weiss who potentially had a cognizable ownership interest in Leewards  
stock, the Fund had never purchased, or even attempted to purchase, 
Google stock.  Thus, the Fund's interest in Google was even more 
attenuated than Weiss's interest in Leewards.  The Fund's failure to 
establish an ownership or a superior, possessory interest in Google stock 
would also indicate that the defendant Manager failed to exercise the 
requisite “unauthorized and wrongful dominion or control” over property 
that the Fund owned or possessed.116 
The preceding analysis regarding the conversion of Google stock fails to 
contemplate the potential for the Fund to bring a claim for the conversion 
of the opportunity to invest in Google.  The Fund might argue that had the 
Manager not converted the opportunity to invest in Google by breaching 
the right of first refusal, the Fund would have purchased Google stock, and 
accordingly, proven the requisite ownership and possession elements of a 
cause of action in conversion.  While, on its face, this argument makes 
good sense, two significant limitations undermine its persuasive value.  
First, considering that the Fund did not provide any advanced consideration 
for the right of first refusal, a substantial question would arise as to whether 
or not the Fund even owned or possessed the “converted” opportunity to 
invest in Google.117  Second, even assuming that the Fund could prove an 
ownership or possessory interest in the opportunity, courts typically have 
not recognized conversion claims for the withholding or dispossession of 
                                                          
 113. Id. at *17. 
 114. Id. at *7. 
 115. Id.; see Simon v. Electrospace (Electrospace), 269 N.E.2d 21, 26 (N.Y. 1971) 
(stating in dictum, consistent with the Leewards court, that a plaintiff does not become the 
owner of stock just because the defendant breached its contract to deliver shares to the 
plaintiff). 
 116. Phansalkar v. Andersen Weinroth & Co., 175 F. Supp. 2d 635, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(quoting Pioneer Commercial Funding Corp. v. United Airlines, Inc., 122 B.R. 871, 833 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991)). 
 117. The fee paid by the Fund to the Manager was based solely on the amounts invested 
by the Fund in identified opportunities.  The contractual fee arrangement necessarily 
implied that the Fund's payment of the fee would take place after the investment had been 
made. 
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“indefinite, intangible, and incorporeal species of property” such as 
opportunities.118 
b. Conversion as a remedy in breach of contract cases 
Apart from the Fund's failure to prove the legal elements of a cause of 
action in conversion, courts often do not permit tort causes of action that 
arise from breaches of contractual duties.119  In fact, several courts have 
ruled that a cause of action in conversion is not available for non-
performance of an agreement.120  For example, in Peters Griffin 
Woodward, Inc. v. WCSC, Inc., the plaintiff, Peters Griffin Woodward, 
Inc., had contracted with the defendant, WCSC, Inc., to be its national sales 
representative in arranging the sale of television advertisement time.121  
When the defendant entered into a new agreement with MMT Sales, Inc. in 
violation of its contract with the plaintiff, the plaintiff sued both for breach 
of contract and conversion of commissions totaling $15,924.09 that 
allegedly had been wrongfully delivered to MMT Sales, Inc.122  The New 
York Appellate Division dismissed the conversion cause of action because 
it was derived from the plaintiff's breach of contract claim.123 
Similarly, in Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Recovery Credit Services, 
Inc.,124 the Second Circuit considered whether a cause of action for fraud is 
                                                          
 118. Phansalkar, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 639 (quoting Matzan v. Eastman Kodak Co., 521 
N.Y.S.2d 917, 918 (App. Div. 1987)); see also Spiegel v. Quality Bakers of Am. Coop., 
Inc., No. 91 Civ. 5702, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17194, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 1992) 
(holding that a cause of action for conversion does not exist to remedy one party's 
cancellation of a licensing agreement); Ippolito v. Lennon, 542 N.Y.S.2d 3, 6 (App. Div. 
1989) (finding that New York “does not generally recognize a cause of action for 
conversion of intangible property” and, on that basis, holding that conversion did not apply 
to a musician's intangible property interest in a concert performance).  Given that damages 
for the loss of something as nebulous as an opportunity would be particularly difficult to 
quantify, courts likely are disinclined to award damages for the conversion of an 
opportunity. 
 119. See Lazar v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 909 P.2d 981, 991 (Cal. 1996) (allowing a claim 
for fraudulent inducement of an unwritten employment contract, not breach of contract); 
Juran v. Bron, No. 16464, 2000 Del. Ch. Lexis 143, at *18 (Del. Ch. Oct. 6, 2000) (stating 
that there is no cause of action for fraud where the wrongful conduct is actually breach of an 
employment contract). 
 120. See Matzan, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 918 (denying claim of conversion for nonperformance 
of contract); see also Cavallo v. Am. Skandia Life Assurance Corp., No. 94 Civ. 2908, 1997 
WL 251538, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 1997) (quoting Kubin v. Miller, 801 F. Supp. 1101, 
1118 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)) (“[Conversion] may not lie for simple non-performance under an 
alleged agreement.  In order to maintain a conversion claim, plaintiff must set forth 
additional allegations of wrongdoing.”). 
 121. Peters Griffin Woodward, Inc. v. WCSC, Inc., 452 N.Y.S.2d 599, 600 (App. Div. 
1982). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id.; see Matzan, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 918 (emphasizing that because plaintiff's claim for 
non-performance was under an alleged agreement, his remedy was to sue for breach of 
contract only; to bring a conversion claim, plaintiff had to make additional allegations of 
wrongdoing). 
 124. 98 F.3d 13 (2d Cir. 1996). 
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available when it is derived from an alleged breach of a contractual duty.125  
Bridgestone/Firestone (“BFI”), the plaintiff, had contracted with various 
agencies to collect delinquencies on credit card accounts.126  When the 
agencies failed to remit those amounts to BFI, BFI brought an action 
alleging fraud and breach of contract.127  The Second Circuit dismissed the 
cause of action for fraud because it concluded that BFI did not (1) 
demonstrate the existence of a legal duty separate from the collection 
agencies' duty to perform under the contract; (2) prove a fraudulent 
misrepresentation collateral or extraneous to the contract; or (3) plead 
special damages caused by the misrepresentation that were unrecoverable 
as contract remedies.128 
Upon analysis, the holdings in both Peters Griffin Woodward and 
Bridgestone/Firestone are consistent with the basic precepts of contract 
law.  A contract imposes duties upon the contracting parties for the 
exchange of goods and services.129  That contract represents the entire 
relationship between the parties and all reasonable expectations flowing 
therefrom.130  Beyond those duties referenced and implied in the contract 
(e.g., good faith and fair dealing), there are no independent or separate 
duties upon which to base a tort claim.131  Therefore, tort claims stemming 
from duties contained within a contract go beyond the reasonable 
expectations the parties had at the time of contract.132  Applying this logic, 
                                                          
 125. Id. at 14. 
 126. Id. at 14-15. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 20; see also Papa's-June Music, Inc. v. McLean, 921 F. Supp. 1154, 1162 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (dismissing fraud claim where it is not sufficiently distinct from breach of 
contract claim); McKernin v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 574 N.Y.S.2d 58, 59 (App. 
Div. 1991) (holding that a cause of action for fraud does not lie where the fraud claim stems 
from an alleged breach of contract and the supporting allegations do not concern 
misrepresentations that are collateral or extraneous to such contract). 
 129. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 1.1, at 4 (2d ed. 1990). 
 130. See U.C.C. § 1-201(12) (2005) (defining a contract as the “total legal obligation 
which results from the parties' agreement”). 
 131. See Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Recovery Credit Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 13, 20 (2d 
Cir. 1996) (stating that to maintain a claim of fraud, plaintiff must “demonstrate a legal duty 
separate from the duty to perform under the contract” or “demonstrate a fraudulent 
misrepresentation collateral or extraneous to the contract”). 
 132. See Lazar v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 909 P.2d 981, 991 (Cal. 1996) (holding that a tort 
remedy does not exist for breach of an employment contract); see also Commonwealth 
Assocs. v. Palomar Med. Techs. (Palomar), 982 F. Supp. 205, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(awarding conversion damages for defendant's breach of an agreement to register warrants 
and issue the underlying shares to the plaintiff). 
The Palomar case is inconsistent with both the Bridgestone/Firestone and Peters Griffin 
Woodward line of cases for a number of reasons.  First, plaintiff's claim for conversion 
damages in Palomar arose out of defendant's breach of its contractual duty to register the 
warrants, issue the shares and assign them to the plaintiff pursuant to a contractual 
arrangement between the parties.  Id.  Second, by not registering the warrants or issuing the 
shares to the plaintiff, the defendant did not exercise unlawful dominion or control over 
stock which the plaintiff owned or in which the plaintiff had a possessory interest.  
Nonetheless, the Palomar Court held that the appropriate recovery would be the greater of 
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the California Supreme Court in Lazar v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc. noted its 
“consistent refusal to validate tort remedies for breach of contract.”133 
The Fund's failure to satisfy the legal elements of a cause of action in 
conversion, along with courts' reluctance to recognize tort claims arising 
out of breaches of contract, precludes the availability of any of the 
conversion damages set forth in Figure 3.1.  Under the factual 
circumstances of the Google hypothetical, the majority of courts instead 
would apply more commonly accepted and legally supportable breach of 
contract principles.  The following section begins with a discussion of the 
taxonomy of interests protected by contract law's remedial framework, 
followed by an analysis of the two prevailing breach of contract remedial 
regimes—specific performance and expectation damages. 
B. Contract Law's Remedial Framework:  The Protection of the 
Expectation, Reliance and Restitution Interests Through Specific and 
Substitutional Relief 
Contract law's remedial framework focuses on three distinct interests.134  
The first, the expectation interest, protects the expected value the contract 
would have had to the aggrieved party had the contract not been 
breached.135  This interest protects the non-breaching party's expectation of 
                                                          
the stock's value at the time of the conversion, or its highest intermediate value between 
notice of the conversion and a reasonable time thereafter.  Id. at 210.  But see Hermanowski 
v. Acton Corp., 580 F. Supp. 140, 145 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that the measure of 
damages for breach of a stock option agreement is the difference between the option price 
and the market value of the stock on the date of the breach). 
The facts of the Palomar case differ from the Google hypothetical.  In particular, the 
defendant in Palomar continued to pay the financial consultation costs to the plaintiff.  It 
was based on this mitigating fact that the Court found that the plaintiff was justified in 
assuming that the defendant would honor its obligation.  Palomar, 982 F. Supp. at 211.  In 
the Google hypothetical, the Fund never paid any consideration for the opportunity to invest 
in Google and, therefore, had no reason to rely on the Manager's presentation of the Google 
opportunity. 
 133. Lazar, 909 P.2d at 991; see also Hunter v. Up-Right, Inc., 864 P.2d 88, 89 (Cal. 
1993) (holding that a “wrongful termination of employment ordinarily does not give rise to 
a cause of action for fraud or deceit, even if some misrepresentation is made in the course of 
the employee's dismissal.”); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 380 (Cal. 1988) 
(declining to expand availability of tort remedies for breach of contract).  In Hunter, Charles 
Hunter (the plaintiff) sued his former employer, Up-Right, Inc., for fraud.  Hunter alleged 
that Up-Right had induced him to resign by falsely claiming that it was going to discontinue 
his position.  Hunter, 864 P.2d at 89.  The Court precluded a recovery for fraud because “the 
result of Up-Right's misrepresentation [was] indistinguishable from an ordinary constructive 
wrongful termination.”  Id. at 93.  Thus, the Court premised its ruling on the theory that tort 
recovery is available only if the plaintiff can establish the existence of fraud separate from 
the termination of the employment contract.  Id. at 94. 
 134. See Avery Katz, Reflections on Fuller and Perdue's The Reliance Interest in 
Contract Damages:  A Positive Economic Framework, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 541, 542-
45 (1988) (suggesting a model of analyzing contract law's remedial framework using a 
backward- and forward-looking, and promissee- and promisor-based approach, in which a 
fourth interest would exist). 
 135. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. b (1981) (“Where the 
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profit by awarding to such party the “benefit of the bargain.”136 
The second interest that the remedial framework protects is the reliance 
interest.137  The reliance principle holds that damages should place the 
plaintiff in the position it would have occupied had the contract never been 
made.138  The reliance interest includes both the costs that the injured party 
has borne in performance, or in preparation for performance, of the 
contract, and incidental costs incurred in preparation for collateral 
transactions.139  Unlike expectation damages, reliance damages do not 
account for the non-breaching party's lost profits as a result of the 
breach.140 
                                                          
injured party's expected advantage consists largely or exclusively of the realization of profit, 
it may be possible to express this loss in value in terms of money with some assurance.”). 
 136. See id. § 347 (defining expectation damages as:  “(a) the loss in value to [the injured 
party] of the other party's performance caused by its failure or deficiency, plus (b) any other 
loss, including incidental or consequential loss, caused by the breach, less (c) any cost or 
other loss that [the injured party] has avoided by not having to perform”); FARNSWORTH, 
supra note 129, § 12.1, at 149-50 (distinguishing the two types of reliance interest:  essential 
reliance, which is reliance that “consists of preparation for and performance under the 
contract in question”; and incidental reliance, which “consists of preparations for collateral 
transactions that a party plans to carry out when the contract in question is performed”); W. 
David Slawson, Why Expectation Damages for Breach of Contract Must be the Norm:  A 
Refutation of the Fuller and Perdue “Three Interests” Thesis, 81 NEB. L. REV. 839, 848 
(2003) (explaining that the rationale behind expectation damages is to give the injured party 
(1) the value of his bargain in every case, and (2) the value of his property in the contract). 
 137. See generally 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 129, § 12.1, at 149-50 (providing 
overview and examples of reliance interest). 
 138. Id. at 149; Katz, supra note 134, at 543. 
 139. See 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 129, § 12.1, at 149-50 (distinguishing reliance in 
preparation of contract performance and reliance in preparation for collateral transactions); 
see also L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 
46 YALE L.J. 52, 78 (1936) (explaining the differences between natural expenses, or 
incidental reliance, and necessary expenses, or essential reliance). 
 140. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 129, § 12.1, at 150.  But see Booker v. Ralston Purina 
Co., 699 F.2d 334, 336 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding no merit in the argument “that we allow 
damages based on some concept of foregone opportunity”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. b (noting that lost profits “may be precluded by the limitation of 
certainty” when calculating expectation damages). 
A court applying the principles of reliance interest in the Google hypothetical would 
likely find that the Fund was not injured by the breach of contract, because the Fund bore no 
costs in performance, or in preparation for performance, of its contract with the Manager.  
According to the contract, the Fund was not required to pay the Manager any advanced 
consideration for the identification of investment opportunities, and thereby avoided any 
costs in preparation for performance.  Instead, the Fund was required to pay the Manager a 
fee of two percent of any amount the Fund invested in an opportunity identified by the 
Manager.  The Fund's payment of the two percent fee necessarily would take place after the 
Fund co-invested with the Manager in an investment opportunity.  Apart from the fund's 
failure to incur costs in preparation for performance, the Fund bore no costs in actual 
performance of the contract. 
Despite its failure to incur costs in connection with the contract, the Fund could argue 
that, in reliance on the contract, it forewent opportunities to enter into contracts with other 
managers.  This argument likely would not withstand scrutiny for two reasons.  First, the 
Fund had no reasonable basis for relying on the Manager given the non-exclusive nature of 
their contractual agreement.  Second, even to the extent parties rely on each other to the 
exclusion of other contracting opportunities, courts typically do not award reliance damages 
in connection with foregone opportunities to enter into other contracts.  See 3 FARNSWORTH, 
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The third, and final, interest protected by contract law's remedial 
framework is the restitution interest.141  While both the expectation and 
reliance interests focus on placing the non-breaching party at some level of 
pre-contractual welfare, the restitution interest attempts to place the 
breaching party in its pre-contractual position by having the breaching 
party disgorge whatever benefit it received from the breach.142  Thus, the 
goal of restitution damages is to prevent the breaching party's unjust 
enrichment.143  As such, this measure of recovery is based on the 
defendant's gain rather than the plaintiff's loss.144  The restitution interest 
includes neither the injured party's lost profits nor its expenditures, 
essential or incidental, in reliance on the contracted performance.145 
Several normative arguments dominate the debate over the propriety of 
expectation, reliance and restitutionary damages for breaches of contract.  
Although an exploration of these normative arguments is beyond the scope 
of this Article, the arguments generally reflect concerns over, inter alia, 
efficiency, the achievement of full compensation, proof of loss, morality 
and the desirability of a fault-based damages regime.146  Notwithstanding 
the normative debate, the doctrinal focus reflected in the case law has been 
on protecting an injured party's expectation interest, particularly in the 
context of commercial bargains.147 
                                                          
supra note 129, § 12.1, at 150 (explaining that courts are unwilling to expand reliance 
interest to include lost investment opportunities due to the unreliable and predictive nature 
of the damage calculation). 
 141. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 129, § 12.1, at 150-51. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id.  See generally Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 
TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1278 (1989) (offering a conceptual and practical overview of restitution 
damages). 
 144. Laycock, supra note 143, at 1279. 
 145. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 129, § 12.1, at 151.  In the Google hypothetical, in not 
paying any advanced consideration to the Manager for the identification of investment 
opportunities, the Fund did not confer a benefit on the Manager that must be disgorged. 
 146. See generally George M. Cohen, Finding Fault with Wonnell's “Two Contractual 
Wrongs”, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 137, 167 (2001) (discussing moral implications of 
expectation and reliance damages and providing a theoretical justification for a fault-based 
damages regime); Fuller & Perdue, Jr., supra note 139, at 60 (explaining how the reliance 
measure provides as great a recovery as the expectation measure when lost opportunities are 
taken into account); Laycock, supra note 143, at 1293 (arguing for the practical significance 
of the restitution remedy “when unjust enrichment is the only basis of substantive liability, 
when defendant's gain exceeds plaintiff's provable loss, or when plaintiff desires the 
property in kind or its proceeds”); Slawson, supra note 136, at 862 (arguing that the 
expectation measure meets the needs of a modern market economy); Ulen, supra note 64, at 
363 (maintaining that from an efficiency standpoint expectation damages are viewed as 
superior to other measures of damages). 
 147. Scholars have explained this doctrinal focus on several theoretical grounds.  Among 
the theoretical arguments offered in support of the desirability of the expectancy interest 
over the reliance and restitution interests as a damages measurement are the expectancy 
interest's achievement of contract law's goal of full compensation, its strong theoretical 
justification for a fault-based damages regime and its superiority from an efficiency 
standpoint.  See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 146, at 151 (explaining why expectation damages 
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Contract law acknowledges two judicial methods for the protection of 
the expectation interest.  The breaching party must either perform under the 
terms of the contract or pay money damages, thereby enabling the injured 
party to purchase a substitute performance or replace lost gains that 
performance would have rendered.148  These judicial remedies can be 
classified as “specific” or “substitutional,” respectively.149 
C. Specific Performance—Specific Relief 
1. The legal framework of specific performance—The “adequacy test” 
The doctrine of specific performance “reflect[s] the principle . . . that the 
law should compel parties specifically to perform their contractual 
obligations.”150  An award of specific performance is intended to protect 
the non-breaching party's expectation interest by putting the non-breaching 
party in the position it would have occupied had the contract not been 
breached.151  Courts award specific performance on a discretionary basis 
and only in extraordinary circumstances.152  As the late E. Allan 
Farnsworth stated, “[o]ur system of contract remedies is not directed at 
compulsion of promisors to prevent breach; it is aimed, instead, at relief to 
                                                          
are superior to reliance damages in deterring opportunistic contract breaches); Katz, supra 
note 134, at 543 (noting continued dominance of expectation interest in commercial 
transactions); Slawson, supra note 136, at 862 (arguing that the expectation interest is the 
only acceptable means of measuring damages from an institutional perspective); Ulen, supra 
note 64, at 362 (discussing how expectation interest may lessen informational asymmetries 
between contracting parties).  Although each of the reliance, restitution and expectation 
interests serves a distinct remedial purpose, the remedial outcome under any of them (under 
the same set of facts) often is the same.  See Katz, supra note 134, at 542 (explaining how 
the economic relationships of the competing damage principles “can be used, under the 
appropriate circumstances, as an approximate measure for the others”). 
 148. Deepa Varadarajan, Note, Tortious Interference and the Law of Contract:  The Case 
for Specific Performance Revisited, 111 YALE L.J. 735, 737 (2001). 
 149. See 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 129, § 12.2, at 152 (distinguishing between 
substitutional relief, which gives the injured party a replacement for the contracted 
performance in the form of money damages, and specific relief, which gives the injured 
party the exact performance that was promised under the contract). 
 150. John M. Catalano, More Fiction than Fact:  The Perceived Differences in the 
Application of Specific Performance under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1807, 1818 (1997) (quoting JOHN O. 
HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTENTIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION 300 (1987) and discussing the interpretation of the Convention in light of its 
underlying principles and its legislative history). 
 151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 357 cmt. a (1981); see 3 FARNSWORTH, 
supra note 129, § 12.4, at 158 (“specific relief is plainly better suited to the objective of 
putting the promisee in the position in which it would have been had the promise been 
performed”). 
 152. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 371 cmt. a (noting that specific 
performance is seldomly granted).  The common law courts generally did not grant specific 
relief in breach of contract cases.  3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 129, § 12.4, at 158.  At 
common law, the usual form of relief was substitutional in the form of an award of 
monetary damages.  Id. 
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promisees to redress breach.”153 
Derived from a court's powers in equity, specific performance is 
available to an injured party when money damages cannot compensate such 
party for the loss resulting from the breach.154  In determining whether 
money damages are adequate, a court will consider:  (1) the difficulty of 
proving monetary damages with reasonable certainty; (2) the difficulty of 
arranging a substitute performance by means of an award of monetary 
damages; and (3) the likelihood that the breaching party will fail to pay 
monetary damages to the injured party.155  These three inquiries comprise 
the “adequacy test” and inform the analysis of the applicability of specific 
performance in the Google hypothetical.156 
The substitutability inquiry is particularly noteworthy because it 
comprises the primary consideration of the “adequacy test.”  This inquiry 
considers whether the procurement of a substitute performance through an 
award of monetary damages is commercially practicable.157  In those 
instances where the arrangement of a substitute transaction is 
impracticable, courts typically award specific performance.  Most courts 
consider obtaining a replacement performance for a transaction involving a 
“unique” good to be impracticable.158  “Unique” means that a court cannot 
obtain, at a reasonable cost, sufficient information about reasonable 
substitute transactions to calculate an appropriate award of damages 
without imposing an excessively high risk of under-compensation on the 
injured party.159  The case law identifies the paradigmatic “unique” goods 
                                                          
 153. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 129, § 12.1, at 146-47. 
 154. See, e.g., Am. Brands, Inc. v. Playgirl, Inc., 498 F.2d 947, 950 (2d Cir. 1974) 
(affirming denial of specific relief because plaintiff failed to establish that “it cannot be 
made whole by monetary relief”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359 cmt. a 
(advising the denial of equitable relief when monetary damages are sufficient). 
 155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360. 
 156. See 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 129, § 12.6, at 167-76 (noting historical 
development of the adequacy test and discussing contemporary application of the three-part 
judicial inquiry). 
 157. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 cmt. c (“If the injured party can 
readily procure by the use of money a suitable substitute for the promised performance, the 
damage remedy is ordinarily adequate.”); Subha Narasimhan, Modification:  The Self-Help 
Specific Performance Remedy, 97 YALE L.J. 61, 71 (1987) (explaining that monetary 
damages are inadequate if the contract goods cannot be purchased in a substitute 
transaction); see also Paul G. Mahoney, Contract Remedies and Options Pricing, 24 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 139, 154 (1995) (noting that specific performance will likely be granted if the 
market for the contract good is “sporadic” or “inefficient”).  The availability of a substitute 
transaction also affords a basis for proving monetary damages with reasonable certainty, 
thereby obviating the inquiry with respect to the first prong of the “adequacy test.”  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 cmt. c. 
 158. See id. (noting that it may be “impracticable” to purchase a substitute of a unique 
good); Mahoney, supra note 157, at 154 (arguing that the specific performance is necessary 
in cases of unique goods because the market for such items is thin or largely speculative); 
Narasimhan, supra note 157, at 71 (explaining that money damages are inadequate for 
unique goods because the injured parties cannot obtain the goods elsewhere). 
 159. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 132 (5th ed., 1998) (“it is 
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as real property and certain items of personal property, such as heirlooms, 
race horses, antiques and works of art.160  Because the market for these 
items is “thin, sporadic, and inefficient, which is a substantial departure 
from the assumption of marketability” underlying substitutional relief 
theory, the non-breaching party's inability to acquire a substitute 
performance, or “cover,” in cases involving “unique” goods indicates the 
aptness of an award of specific performance.161 
2. The application of specific performance to stock cases 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that transfers of shares of 
stock in a corporation may qualify for specific relief if the shares are not 
publicly-traded or otherwise available.162  The Restatement's interpretation 
of specific performance considers the inability of a party to arrange a 
readily-ascertainable proxy for non-publicly traded stock as evidence of the 
propriety of specific relief.163  Consistent with the Restatement's view, 
courts have specifically enforced contracts where the breaching party failed 
to deliver securities that were not publicly-traded.164  For instance, in 
Dominick v. Vassar,165 two co-equal owners of stock in a closely-held 
corporation, E.L. Dominick, Jr. (“Dominick”) and John Vassar (“Vassar”), 
                                                          
possible to obtain injunctive relief upon a showing that your damages remedy would be 
inadequate, for example because your damages cannot be computed with reasonable 
accuracy”); see also Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 
363-64 (1978) (arguing that if a good lacks a well-developed market from which the court 
can reliably calculate damages, there is a substantial risk that the court will 
undercompensate the injured party).  U.C.C. § 2-716(1) permits specific performance where 
goods are unique or in “other proper circumstances.”  U.C.C. § 2-716 (2000).  Comments to 
the U.C.C. note that the “inability to cover is strong evidence of other proper 
circumstances.”  Id. (quotation omitted). 
 160. Mahoney, supra note 157, at 154; see 3 SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON SALES § 
25-46, at 698 (5th ed. 1994) (discussing cases relating to disputes over artworks, heirlooms 
and vessels). 
 161. Mahoney, supra note 157, at 154; see U.C.C. § 2-716, cmt. 2 (recommending 
specific performance when the buyer is unable to cover); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 360 (arguing that the damage remedy is inadequate for unique goods); 
Narasimhan, supra note 157, at 71 (noting that courts traditionally inquire about a good's 
uniqueness in determining the availability of a substitute market transaction). 
 162. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 cmt. c (noting that damages may 
be inadequate when “[s]hares of stock in a corporation may not be obtainable elsewhere”). 
 163. See id. (“If goods are unique in kind, quality or personal association, the purchase 
of an equivalent elsewhere may be impracticable, and the buyer's 'inability to cover is strong 
evidence of' the propriety of granting specific performance.” (quoting U.C.C. § 2-716, cmt. 
2 (2000))). 
 164. See Brown v. Knox, 361 N.W.2d 540, 543 (Neb. 1985) (“[C]ontracts for acquisition 
of shares of a closely held family corporation, which stock is not obtainable in the open 
market, are proper subjects for specific performance.”); Chadwell v. English, 652 P.2d 310, 
314 (Okla. 1982) (affirming decision to grant specific performance of a contract to sell stock 
that “existed in extremely low volume, was not traded in a ready market, and was seldom 
exchanged”). 
 165. 367 S.E.2d 487 (Va. 1988). 
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entered into a stock option purchase agreement.166  The parties agreed that 
the surviving stockholder would have the right to purchase the decedent 
stockholder's shares at book value within ninety days of the decedent 
stockholder's death.167  When Vassar died, his wife refused to tender his 
shares to Dominick.168  Noting that “the stock [was] not readily purchasable 
in the market and its pecuniary value [was] uncertain and not easily 
ascertainable,”169 the Court specifically enforced the share purchase 
agreement by ordering Vassar's wife to tender Vassar's stock in the closely-
held corporation to Dominick.170 
Similarly, in Medcom Holding Co. v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories,171 a 
dispute originated out of a stock purchase agreement between Medcom 
Holding Co. (“Holding”) and Baxter Travenol Laboratories (“Baxter”), in 
which Holding agreed to purchase all of the stock in Baxter's subsidiary, 
Medcom.172  The stock purchase agreement listed Medcom's assets, 
including a $10,000 investment in Entertainment Partners, Inc. (“EPI”).173  
Baxter failed to convey any of the EPI stock to Holding at the closing.174  
The Seventh Circuit contemplated whether specific performance would be 
an appropriate remedy for Baxter's breach of the agreement regarding 
EPI.175  Emphasizing that EPI's stock was not publicly-traded, the Court 
specifically enforced the contract and ordered the stock's delivery “on the 
ground that valuation is imprecise without an active market for the 
stock.”176 
In light of the non-public nature of stock in venture-financed companies, 
both the Restatement's discussion of specific performance and the 
Vassar/Medcom cases point to the potential availability of specific relief in 
the Google hypothetical.  The following section sets forth the theoretical 
framework of specific performance and considers the remedy's application 
to the facts of the Google hypothetical. 
3. The application of specific performance to the Google hypothetical 
Notwithstanding the legal limitations reflected in the “adequacy test,” a 
                                                          
 166. Id. at 488. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 488-89. 
 169. Id. at 489-90 (quoting Fanney v. Inv. Corp., 107 S.E.2d 414, 421 (Va. 1959)). 
 170. Id. at 490. 
 171. 984 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 172. Id. at 225. 
 173. Id. at 225-26. 
 174. Id. at 226. 
 175. See id. at 227 (noting that “[u]nlike contract construction,” specific performance is 
an equitable determination that will be reversed only for abuse of discretion). 
 176. Id. at 227; see also Owen v. Merts, 405 S.W.2d 273, 279-80 (Ark. 1966) (holding 
that appellants were entitled to specific performance of contract for shares of stock because 
shares were unique and not available on the market). 
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delay in litigation may limit specific performance's availability, even if the 
market for the good in question is scarce.177  Theoretical considerations 
mitigate against the application of specific relief when there has been a 
delay in litigation (i.e., the remedial course of action sought is no longer 
congruous with the circumstances as they existed at the time of the 
breach).178  Hypothetically, suppose that two parties (Party A and Party B) 
entered into a contract pursuant to which Party A agreed to present to Party 
B the option to purchase tickets for the Yankees/Braves World Series 
games in 1999.  If Party A failed to present to Party B that option and Party 
B sued after the completion of the World Series games, it would be 
impossible for a court to compel Party A to specifically perform the 
contract.179  As noted above, the goal of specific performance is to protect a 
non-breaching party's expectation interest by tendering to that party the 
exact performance promised in the contract.180  The World Series example 
indicates that a lapse of time may result in a court's inability to compel the 
promisor's delivery of the contracted performance, and failure to protect the 
promisee's expectancy interest.181 
                                                          
 177. See Bander v. Grossman, 611 N.Y.S.2d 985, 990 (App. Div. 1994) (“[W]ith a 
greater delay, where a defendant has changed position or taken any economic risk, the court 
may conclude that 'the plaintiff will lose nothing but an uncontemplated opportunity to 
gather a windfall.'“ (citing Concert Radio v. GAF Corp., 488 N.Y.S.2d 696, 700 (App. Div. 
1985))). 
 178. See In re J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. Shareholder Litig., No. 531-N, 2005 WL 
1076069, at *12 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005) (noting that because plaintiffs failed to act 
promptly to preserve equitable remedies “the 'eggs' have been irretrievably 'scrambled' and 
there is no possibility of effective equitable relief”). 
 179. See Bander, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 990 (“With the passage of time, specific performance 
becomes disfavored . . . .  [B]ecause goods are subject to a rapid change in condition, or the 
cost of maintenance of the goods is important, time may be found to have been of the 
essence, and even a month's delay may defeat specific performance . . . .” (citing Ziebarth v. 
Kalenze, 238 N.W.2d 261 (N.D. 1976); Putnam Ranches, Inc. v. Corkle, 203 N.W.2d 502 
(Neb. 1973))). 
 180. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359(1) (1981) (noting that specific 
performance is appropriate when money damages would be inadequate to protect the 
“expectation interest of the injured party”). 
 181. The Fund's delay in bringing suit made specific performance an unsuitable remedy 
for the Manager's breach because of the availability of an ascertainable market replacement 
for the Fund's diverted Google shares at the time of the hypothetical litigation.  Assuming 
that the Fund had brought suit when the Google shares remained privately-held, a stronger 
argument could be made for an award of specific performance.  This is because monetary 
damages might not enable the Fund to readily purchase substitute Google shares on the 
market.  However, the longer the elapsed period of time between the lawsuit and the breach, 
the less likely courts are to award specific performance, even if the market for the goods is 
scarce.  See Narasimhan, supra note 157, at 69 (“The option of suing for specific 
performance is thus untenable where there is a significant delay in litigation.”).  The concern 
is that parties, like the Fund, would unfairly receive windfalls. 
For example, in December 2000, when the Manager made a second investment in Google, 
the Fund's four percent allocable ownership interest ($2.5 million) in Google would have 
been worth $20.267 million.  If a court had awarded specific performance to the Fund in 
December 2000, the Fund would have received $20.267 million worth of Google shares in 
exchange for a contract price of $2.5 million.  Additionally, if a court had awarded specific 
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The Google hypothetical illustrates both the legal and theoretical 
inaptness of specific relief where there has been a delay in litigation.  From 
a legal standpoint, by the time of the Fund's lawsuit, Google's shares were 
traded publicly.182  Therefore, unlike the stock at issue in Vassar and 
Medcom, the Google stock failed to meet the “uniqueness” requirement for 
specific performance set forth in the “adequacy test.”183  Consistent with 
the Restatement's discussion of specific performance, the availability of 
Google shares on the public market at the time of the Fund's lawsuit 
indicates the commercial practicability of a substitute transaction.184 
Even assuming arguendo that the Fund could argue for the commercial 
impracticability of a market substitute on the basis of the difficulty of 
acquiring a full four percent ownership interest in the company when only 
7.23% of Google's shares had been issued as part of the IPO, the Manager's 
inability to deliver the contracted performance to the Fund points to the 
theoretical inaptness of specific relief in the Google hypothetical.185  The 
Manager was contractually obligated to present to the Fund the opportunity 
                                                          
performance immediately before the IPO, the Fund would have received $924 million worth 
of Google shares in exchange for its $2.5 million investment.  These windfalls suggest that 
specific performance should only be available for a short period after the breach when the 
contract price of the investment still closely approximates the market value of the 
investment.  See Scully v. US WATS, Inc., 238 F.3d 497, 509 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that if 
stock valuation was based on a time period significantly after the breach, the injured party 
would possess “the benefit of hindsight”); Tamari v. Bache & Co., 838 F.2d 904, 907 (7th 
Cir. 1988) (arguing against damage measures that allow injured parties to calculate lost 
profits on the basis of a high stock value that occurred after the date of breach); see also 
Miller v. Bloomberg, 466 N.E.2d 1342, 1348 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (denying specific 
performance where property had appreciated during two-and-one-half-year delay); Hawks v. 
Sparks, 133 S.E.2d 536, 540 (Va. 1963) (denying specific performance where property had 
appreciated during five-year delay). 
 182. See Google Prospectus, supra note 2, at 2 (outlining Google's initial public offering 
on August 18, 2004). 
 183. See Lucente v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 310 F.3d 243, 262-63 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(dismissing plaintiffs' specific performance argument for IBM stock options on the grounds 
that “[t]here is simply no reason why, assuming a jury finds IBM liable for breach of 
contract, money damages would not adequately compensate Lucente”); see also Simon v. 
Electrospace (Electrospace), 269 N.E.2d 21, 26 (N.Y. 1971) (noting that specific 
performance is not appropriate where the claim involves publicly-traded stock). 
 184. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 cmt. c (“Entering into a 
substitute transaction is generally a more efficient way to prevent injury than is a suit for 
specific performance . . . .”).  The availability of a substitute transaction also affords a basis 
for proving monetary damages with reasonable certainty and thereby diminishes the 
relevance of the remedy of specific performance.  Id. 
 185. The Fund might argue that although some Google shares were technically available 
on the market as of the date of its IPO, the Google shares were not practically available to 
the Fund (or any other investor) to the extent of the four percent block needed by the Fund 
to acquire the number of shares that had been withheld from the Fund by the Manager.  The 
Fund might also argue that it would have been exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for 
any investor to acquire the four percent ownership interest, especially since Google issued 
19.6 million shares as part of its IPO and those shares represented only approximately 
7.23% of the company.  Google Prospectus, supra note 2, at 2.  In other words, the Fund 
would have had to purchase fifty-five percent of the shares that were issued as part of the 
IPO in order to acquire a four percent ownership interest. 
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to invest in Google, a nascent company seeking venture capital investors in 
1999.  That opportunity, which only existed in 1999, could not be 
replicated by a court in 2004 given Google's dramatic growth in the 
intervening period.186  The passage of more than five years between the 
date of the breach and the date of the lawsuit simply eliminates any 
possibility of reproducing the facts and circumstances surrounding the 1999 
Google investment opportunity.187 
In summary, the legal limitations of the “adequacy test,” as well as the 
theoretical framework of specific performance, point to the impropriety of 
specific relief under the facts of the Google hypothetical.  The following 
section discusses substitutional relief theory and considers its application to 
the Google hypothetical. 
D. Expectation Damages—Substitutional Relief 
Rather than compelling parties to perform their contracts, the remedial 
framework of contract law historically has been directed at providing 
substitutional relief to non-breaching parties through an award of monetary 
damages.188  Underlying the historic preference for substitutional relief is 
the rationale that the system of free enterprise and the market economy 
enable an injured party to procure a substitute transaction through an award 
of monetary damages.189 
1. The legal framework for expectation damages 
The rule of law for calculating expectation damages is well-settled.  That 
rule was explained by the New York Court of Appeals in Simon v. 
Electrospace.190  The Court held that “[t]he proper measure of damages for 
breach of contract is determined by the loss sustained or gain prevented at 
the time and place of breach.”191  Applying that rule of law to breaches of 
stock or stock option agreements, the Electrospace Court calculated 
                                                          
 186. Granting specific performance now would be like ordering a casino to pay out a 
roulette bet after the roulette wheel stopped spinning, because the casino had denied a 
gambler an opportunity to bet and the gambler claims he would have bet on the winning 
number or color. 
 187. As evidenced by the remarkable ascent in the value of Google after the Manager's 
initial venture capital investment, the same opportunity to invest $2.5 million in exchange 
for a four percent ownership interest in Google no longer existed.  In fact, a four percent 
ownership interest in Google at the time of the Fund's lawsuit was worth approximately $2 
billion.  This limitation is in addition to the fact that the Manager had already sold the 
Google investment when the Fund sued, thereby precluding it from turning over fifty 
percent of its shares to the Fund. 
 188. See 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 129, § 12.1, at 146-47 (discussing why contract law 
focuses on redressing breaches rather than preventing breaches). 
 189. See id. § 12.4, at 160-61 (noting that market proponents encouraged the 
development of the adequacy test). 
 190. 269 N.E.2d 21 (N.Y. 1971). 
 191. Id. at 26 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
COSENZA OFFTOPRINTER 2/24/2006  1:33:57 PM 
122 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:87 
damages by taking the difference between the contract (or option) price of 
the stock and the market value of the stock on the date of the breach.192  
Although the Electrospace case involved a breach of a contract to pay a 
commission to a finder of business opportunities, the Court explicitly noted 
that the expectancy formula for damages applied to breaches of contract 
involving the non-delivery of shares of stock.193 
A number of courts have applied the expectancy formula for damages in 
cases involving breaches of stock or stock option agreements.194  Of 
particular note in this regard is the Third Circuit's decision in Scully v. US 
WATS, Inc.195  In Scully, US WATS, Inc., a telecommunications carrier, 
granted Mark Scully, its president and chief operations officer, the option 
to purchase 850,000 shares of restricted company stock vesting over a two-
year period.196  The restriction provided that upon exercise of the option, 
Scully could not transfer the stock for a period of up to one year from the 
date of exercise.197  When Scully attempted to exercise the option, US 
WATS, Inc. refused to honor his request.198  Although Scully argued that 
his damages should be calculated from the expiration of the applicable 
restricted periods of the shares, the Third Circuit instead followed the 
Electrospace Court by measuring Scully's damages from the date of the 
breach (i.e., when Scully attempted to exercise his stock option).199  
According to the Scully Court, using any other measurement would unfairly 
                                                          
 192. Id. at 26-27; see also Scully v. US WATS, Inc., 238 F.3d 497, 510 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(comparing the Electrospace court's contract theory of damage with a conversion theory of 
damage); 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 129, § 12.12, at 227-31 (discussing market price 
formulas). 
 193. Electrospace, 269 N.E.2d at 26. 
 194. See Oscar Gruss & Son, Inc. v. Hollander, 337 F.3d 186, 196-97 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(rejecting the use of the conversion measure of damages in breach of contract cases and 
holding that damages for breaches of contract should place the plaintiff in the same position 
he would have occupied had the contract been performed); Lucente v. Int'l Bus. Mach. 
Corp., 310 F.3d 243, 262-63 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that the district court “ignored binding 
precedent” by calculating damages under a conversion measure rather than the breach of 
contract measure); Hermanowski v. Acton Corp., 729 F.2d 921, 922 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(affirming that damages in a breach of contract action involving stock options should be 
measured as of the date of the breach); Boyce v. Soundview Tech. Group, Inc., No. 03-
2159, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20635, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2004) (stating that in a breach 
of contract action, damages should be calculated from the date of the breach); Aroneck v. 
Atkin, 456 N.Y.S.2d 558, 559 (App. Div. 1982) (“[D]amages for defendants' breach of 
contract to purchase plaintiffs' stock . . . [are computed] by ascertaining the difference 
between the agreed price of the shares and the fair market value at the time of the 
breach . . . .”); see also Arlington State Bank v. Colvin, 545 N.E.2d 572, 575 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1989) (holding that the measure of damages for a vendor's failure to convey land in breach 
of a right of first refusal is the difference between the contract price and the market value of 
the land at the time of the breach). 
 195. Scully, 238 F.3d 497. 
 196. Id. at 503. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 504. 
 199. Id. at 508. 
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give a party the benefit of hindsight and the ability to monitor the 
fluctuations of the market to then “cherry-pick” a date yielding the most 
advantageous damages outcome.200  The Court further explained its holding 
by noting that while Scully's stock option reduced his risk of loss and 
increased his opportunity for profit, it neither eliminated all risk, nor 
guaranteed a profit.201  Accordingly, the Court refused to grant to Scully, on 
an ex post basis, an investment free of any risk of market downturn.202  By 
measuring Scully's damages from the date of the breach, the Scully Court 
expressed a distinct preference for the ex ante calculation of damages in 
breach of contract cases.203 
The application of the expectancy formula of damages to the Google 
hypothetical requires the determination of both the “contract price” and the 
“market value” of the Google stock on the date of the breach (June 1999).  
The following sections address:  (1) the meaning of these terms in the 
context of venture capital investment and (2) their specific application to 
the Google hypothetical. 
2. Calculating expectation damages 
The contract price of stock typically is explicitly set forth in the parties' 
agreement, and as such, is easily identifiable.204  The determination of 
market value, on the other hand, requires a more sophisticated analysis.  As 
a general proposition, fair market value is the price at which property 
would change hands in a transaction between a willing buyer and a willing 
seller, neither being forced to buy or sell and both having a reasonable 
knowledge of relevant facts.205   
                                                          
 200. See id. at 509 (noting that with the benefit of hindsight the plaintiff could place 
himself in a better position than if no breach of contract had occurred); see also Tamari v. 
Bache & Co., 838 F.2d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 1988) (arguing that the conversion measure of 
damages “is a generous—maybe too generous—measure of damages; it assumes that the 
customer would have had the clairvoyance to sell when the stock hit its peak during the 
relevant period, and by so assuming systematically overcompensates defrauded investors”).  
In the Scully Appellee/Cross Appellant's Principal Brief, Scully argued that while measuring 
damages from the date he proposed did in fact result in a higher award to him, if the stock 
had fallen during the restricted period, he would have received a lower damages award.  
Appellee/Cross Appellant's Principal Brief at 25, Scully v. US WATS, Inc., 238 F.3d 497 
(3d Cir. 2001) (Nos. 99-1590, 99-1653), available at 2000 WL 34004909.  Scully argued 
that measuring damages as of the end of the restricted periods of the shares did not result in 
any windfall to him.  Id.  It merely compensated him for what he actually lost by 
acknowledging what occurred to the value of the stock during the interim period.  Id. 
 201. Scully, 238 F.3d at 513. 
 202. Id. 
 203. See id. at 512 (noting that Scully's request to determine damages at the expiration of 
the restricted holding period is “contrary to the general rule that damages for a breach of 
contract are determined on the breach date”). 
 204. See id. at 508 (using the stock option's exercise price as the contract price). 
 205. United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 551 (1973); Arc Realty Co. v. Comm'r, 
295 F.2d 98, 103 (8th Cir. 1961) (“The question of 'fair market value,' [is] defined [as] 'the 
price at which property would change hands in a transaction between a willing buyer and a 
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Courts have employed this analysis of market value in resolving 
valuation issues for complex merger and tax disputes.206  Unlike publicly-
traded stock whose trading price serves as a readily-ascertainable proxy for 
its market value, no such proxy for market value is available for privately-
held stock, including stock in venture-financed companies.207  Applying the 
valuation analysis described above, the Southern District of New York, in 
Boyce v. Soundview Tech. Group, Inc.,208 instructed the jury on how to 
determine the market value of the plaintiff's stock options on the date of the 
breach.209  The Court stated that “the sale price for the same asset, sold 
close to the time of the asset being valued, if it is the result of arm's length 
negotiations, is the best evidence of fair market value.”210  The Court 
promulgated this standard because the stock at issue was in a private 
company, was not actively traded on any exchange and had no readily-
available proxy for its market value.211 
Venture capital companies may be valued based on their business plan 
and their ability to translate that plan into future growth in earnings and 
revenues.212  Admittedly, this is a vague methodology on which to base a 
valuation,213 and “[t]here is no single formula universally applicable in 
                                                          
willing seller, neither being under compulsion to buy nor to sell and both being informed'“ 
(quoting O'Malley v. Ames, 197 F.2d 256, 257 (8th Cir. 1952)). 
 206. See, e.g., Krapf v. United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 750, 759 (Cl. Ct. 1989) (determining the 
fair market value of a minority interest of a common stock gifted to the University of 
Delaware as the price agreed upon by a knowledgeable and reasonable buyer and seller 
under no obligation to buy or sell), rev'd, 977 F.2d 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Gatlin v. Comm'r, 
44 T.C.M. (CCH) 945, 951 (T.C. 1982) (evaluating the fair market value of unlisted stock 
contributed to charity as the price at which it would exchange hands between a reasonable 
buyer and seller); Van de Walle v. Unimation, No. 7046, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 27, at *15 
(Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 1991) (explaining that fairness of merger price resulted from arms-length 
bargaining). 
 207. See, e.g., Schonfeld v. Hilliard, 218 F.3d 164, 178 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that the 
lack of proxy for market value in privately-held stock leads to the hypothetical market 
standard of knowledgeable exchange between willing hands); Boyce v. Soundview Tech. 
Group, Inc., No. 03-2159, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20635, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2004) 
(noting the difficulty in valuing stock if the shares are in a private company and not actively 
traded on any exchange). 
 208. Boyce, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20635. 
 209. Id. at *8. 
 210. Id. at *7; see Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 741-42 (1997) 
(finding that the sale price for the subject asset, if negotiated by the parties at arm's length, 
was the “best evidence” of its market value). 
 211. Boyce, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20635, at *8. 
 212. See Krapf v. United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 750, 764-66 (Cl. Ct. 1989) (stating that start-
up companies “usually have not experienced earnings, have not the capacity to pay 
dividends . . . or have a negative asset or book value in the valuation years” and “[p]otential 
earnings or performance of the corporation cannot be estimated without understanding the 
economic and organizational foundation upon which the corporation is built”); see also 
Gatlin v. Comm'r, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 945, 951 (T.C. 1982) (holding that the value of a 
venture capital company is based on its concept and its ability to grow in earnings and 
revenues). 
 213. See Krapf, 17 Cl. Ct. at 766 (“Valuation of a venture capital corporation is a fact-
intensive study of the conditions and circumstances of the corporation at the valuation 
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determining such value” for a venture capital company.214  Yet, like other 
valuations, actual sales of stock may be, and often have been, used to guide 
a determination of fair market value in the venture capital context.215  In 
fact, the Federal Circuit in Okerlund v. United States216 asserted that “arms-
length stock sales” should be used to value stock in venture capital 
companies whose valuation “is an inexact science (some might say an 
art).”217  The fact that the sales price is negotiated by a seller seeking the 
highest available price and a buyer willing to pay that price after a diligent 
canvassing of the market supports the propriety of this valuation 
methodology for stock in venture capital companies.218  Measures other 
than the “sales-price” measure necessarily rely on the subjective thought 
process of a valuation expert instead of a transaction price that “was forged 
in the crucible of objective market reality.”219 
Following this logic, courts generally are reluctant to consider facts that 
come to fruition after the sale of the stock to determine fair market value.  
For instance, in Saltzman v. Commissioner,220 a case involving assessed 
unpaid gift taxes, the Second Circuit stated that “subsequent events are not 
considered in fixing fair market value except to the extent that they were 
reasonably foreseeable” on the date of the donation.221  The Saltzman 
analysis indicates that the valuation of stock in venture capital companies 
also may be accomplished “without reference to events which occur after 
the date” of the sale of the stock.222  This is consistent with the Scully 
Court's refusal to calculate damages on an ex post basis and courts' general 
reluctance to rely on stock price projections to determine fair market 
value.223 
                                                          
date.”). 
 214. Id. at 760. 
 215. See id. (“Fair market value of unlisted stocks can be determined by examining 
actual sales made at arm's length in the normal course of business.”). 
 216. 365 F.3d 1044 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 217. Id. at 1052. 
 218. See Van de Walle v. Unimation, No. 7046, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 27, at *50 (Del. 
Ch. Mar. 6, 1991) (finding that the merger price was fair because it was the result of an 
arms-length negotiation after an extensive canvassing of the market). 
 219. Id.; see also Krapf v. United States, 977 F.2d 1454, 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(determining that part of “the willing-buyer/willing-seller analysis ensures that the value of 
the stock is realistic in light of true market conditions.”). 
 220. 131 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 221. Id. at 93 (“[Value] depends largely on more or less certain prophecies of the future; 
and the value is no less real at that time if later the prophecy turns out false than when it 
comes out true.” (quoting Justice Holmes in Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151, 
155 (1929))); see also Boyce v. Soundview Tech. Group, Inc., No. 03-2159, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 20635, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2004) (rejecting a hypothetical damage 
assessment based on forward looking evidence because of its speculative and unreliable 
nature in determining stock prices). 
 222. Saltzman, 131 F.3d at 93 (quoting Krapf, 977 F.2d at 1458). 
 223. Scully v. US WATS, Inc., 238 F.3d 497, 512-13 (3d Cir. 2001); see Boyce, 2004 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20635, at *6 (“Estimates as to the potential value of a stock or predictions 
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3. Expectancy as applied to the Google hypothetical 
The application of the expectancy formula of damages to the Google 
hypothetical requires the determination of:  (1) the contract price of the 
Fund's allocable Google stock (had the Manager presented the opportunity 
to invest in Google to the Fund) and (2) the market value of what would 
have been the Fund's Google stock on the date of the breach.  The analysis 
regarding the contract price of the Fund's allocable Google stock is 
relatively straightforward.  Had the Manager offered the Fund its 
contractual fifty percent right of participation, the contract price of the 
Fund's Google investment would have been $2.5 million (fifty percent of 
the Manager's $5 million investment). 
By contrast, the determination of the market value of the Google stock 
on the date of the breach is not as simple.  Notably, Google was not a 
publicly-traded company on the date of the breach, and therefore, had no 
readily-available proxy (i.e. the stock's trading price) for the market value 
of its stock.224  However, as noted above, courts have asserted that in the 
absence of a traditional public market, the price investors are willing to pay 
for their investments in arms-length transactions reflects the market value 
of that investment.225  Applying the “sales-price” standard to the Google 
hypothetical, the market value of the Google stock on the date of the breach 
also would have been $2.5 million—the price the Fund would have paid in 
an arms-length transaction for a four percent ownership interest in 
Google.226  Thus, the application of the expectancy formula (contract price 
($2.5 million)—market value on the date of the breach ($2.5 million)) to 
the Google hypothetical would result in zero damages for the Fund. 
Apart from the legal support for this remedial outcome based on existing 
law for analogous stock option cases, Part IV of this Article offers an 
economic-based justification for this outcome using an agency theory of 
monitoring costs.227  The theory of monitoring costs posits that an investor, 
                                                          
as to future stock prices are notoriously unreliable.  Admitting market projections of . . . 
shares in the months following the breach as evidence would be tantamount to relying on 
the Farmer's Almanac predictions of rain for the upcoming harvest.”). 
 224. See Schonfeld v. Hilliard, 218 F.3d 164, 178 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Although it is easier 
to determine an asset's market value when it is actively traded on a standardized exchange or 
commodities market, an asset does not lose its value simply because no such market exists.” 
(citing JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 14-12 (3d ed. 
1987))). 
 225. See Boyce, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20635, at *7-8 (denying grounds for a new trial 
because jury was properly instructed to assess the fair market value of a stock as the sale 
price that resulted from arm's length negotiations). 
 226. See id. (evaluating the fair market value on the date of a breach by determining 
what a hypothetical willing buyer would pay for the stock on that day). 
 227. See Michele Bagella et al., In Quest for Equity Partners:  The Determinants of the 
Willingness to Go Public or to Find a Venture Capital Partner 13-14 (Tor Vergata Univ., 
Ctr. for Int'l Studies on Econ. Growth, Working Paper No. 123, 1999), available at 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/rtv/ceiswp/123.html (explaining through algebraic formulas how 
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after the execution of a contract, will incur reasonable costs in monitoring a 
manager that are less than or equal to its expected ex post profits on an 
investment.228  Reflecting a non-breaching party's compensable expectancy 
interest, these monitoring costs serve as a measurable and identifiable 
proxy for damages in the event of a breach of contract.  Part IV develops an 
analytical framework for the consideration of breaches of rights of first 
refusal based on the post-execution monitoring costs of non-breaching 
parties. 
IV. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR BREACHES OF RIGHTS OF FIRST 
REFUSAL BASED ON A THEORY OF MONITORING COSTS 
As discussed in Part I, the inherent uncertainties surrounding the 
financing of innovation-intensive companies result in informational 
asymmetries within various venture capital arrangements, including the 
GP/limited partner, entrepreneur/investor and manager/fund relationships.  
Agency theory and practice have identified a number of mechanisms that 
mitigate these asymmetries through pre-contract screening, sophisticated 
contracting and post-contract monitoring.229  Before deciding whether to 
invest, investors engage in due diligence to screen out unprofitable 
projects, bad entrepreneurs or poor managers.230  Once the decision to 
invest has been made, complex financial contracts allocate various cash 
flow and control rights (e.g., voting rights, liquidation rights and board 
rights) among the contracting parties.231  These rights facilitate post-
contract monitoring and reduce some of the risks associated with venture 
capital finance.232  After the parties execute the financial contract, investors 
and/or funds incur post-execution monitoring costs which are intended to 
minimize potential losses arising out of an investment or increase the 
potential upside value of an investment.233 
The last of these mechanisms—post-execution monitoring—has 
substantial analytical and theoretical appeal as the basis for establishing a 
remedial regime for breaches of rights of first refusal.  After setting forth 
                                                          
monitoring costs affect profits). 
 228. See id. (illustrating how a change in monitoring costs disproportionate to projected 
value makes venture capital an advantage over going public). 
 229. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Venture Capitalists as Principals:  
Contracting, Screening, and Monitoring 8-9 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 8202, 2001), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8202.pdf (showing that 
pre-contract screening, sophisticated contracting, and post-contract monitoring and advising 
are closely interrelated and mitigate Fund/Manager conflicts). 
 230. See id. at 1 (enumerating ways in which investors may screen out unprofitable 
projects, such as structuring the financial contracts, collecting information before deciding 
whether to invest and monitoring during the project). 
 231. Id. at 2. 
 232. Id. at 9. 
 233. Id. 
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the basic framework of the monitoring costs theory, this Part applies the 
theory to the Google hypothetical and three factual scenarios derived from 
the Google hypothetical. 
A. Description of the Monitoring Costs Framework 
Monitoring is a concept that has had its greatest support and application 
in the field of economics.  Monitoring costs generally consist of those 
expenses associated with investigation, risk-assessment, underwriting and 
auditing.234  In the Google hypothetical, monitoring costs would entail 
those expenses incurred by the Fund in ensuring that the Manager 
presented all investment opportunities identified during the term of the 
contract.  Those expenses might include costs relating to the inspection and 
audit of the Manager's books, review of venture-capital financed 
companies' public disclosures, repeated discussions with the Manager 
regarding its “prospecting” activities, review of trade journals and industry-
specific web sites and continuing and proactive conversations with other 
industry participants to collect information on potential investment 
opportunities. 
The theory of monitoring costs posits that a principal will incur 
reasonable costs in monitoring its agent that are less than or equal to the 
principal's expected ex post profits on the contract.235  Applying this theory 
to the Google hypothetical, the Fund, the principal, will expend costs 
monitoring the Manager, its agent, in the post-execution period of the co-
investment agreement that are less than or equal to the Fund's expected ex 
post profits on the contract.  This Article proposes that these monitoring 
costs reflect the Fund's compensable expectancy interest in the co-
investment agreement, and accordingly, serve as a measurable and 
identifiable proxy for expectation damages in the event of a breach of 
contract. 
In protecting a contracting party's ex ante calculation of expected profit 
(as opposed to its ex post calculation of actual profit), the monitoring costs 
framework comports with the existing expectancy formula for damages.  
However, unconstrained by the formulaic methodology of the existing 
damages regime, a remedial framework based on monitoring costs would 
offer a more practical, fact-based approach to analyzing damages for 
breaches of rights of first refusal in the venture capital context. 
                                                          
 234. Avery Wiener Katz, An Economic Analysis of the Guaranty Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 47, 113 (1999) (listing the various costs associated with supplying credit in the 
standard guaranty transaction). 
 235. See Bagella et al., supra note 227, at 13 (calculating the profit function for 
shareholders assuming that monitoring costs are not proportional to ex post cash flow). 
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B. The Fundamental Assumptions of the Monitoring Costs Framework 
A number of assumptions underlie the monitoring costs framework.  
First, the contracting parties (the Fund and the Manager) have not 
bargained in advance for a liquidated damages clause.  Second, the 
contracting parties are rational and sophisticated.  Third, litigation costs 
and transaction costs are zero.  Fourth, after entering the co-investment 
agreement with the Manager, the Fund will calculate its expected profits on 
that contract.  In theory, the profits will encompass a continuum of possible 
profits and an accompanying set of probabilities ranging from zero to one-
hundred percent, as well as a continuum (bounded by the contractual terms 
between the Manager and the Fund) of possible percentage ownerships up 
to fifty percent by the Fund in any investment opportunity.  Fifth, the Fund 
is risk neutral.  For instance, the utility to the Fund of a certain $5 is 
equivalent to the utility of an equally valuable gamble (e.g., an investment 
that has a fifty percent chance of a $0 return and a fifty percent chance of a 
$10 return).  Sixth, while in the Google hypothetical a number of 
investment opportunities could have been the subject of a breach, for the 
sake of simplicity, the proposed framework assumes that there is only one 
opportunity to obtain an investment made by the Manager.  Seventh, the 
Fund's calculation of expected profit does not change from the date the 
parties enter into the contract (the “Execution Date”) to the date the 
Manager sells the opportunity for a gain (the “Sale Date”).  Eighth, the 
Fund's costs of monitoring are fixed from the Execution Date to the Sale 
Date.  Ninth, the costs of monitoring are expenses that, by default, the Fund 
alone bears and that cannot be passed to the Manager in a lawsuit.  Finally, 
if the Fund monitors, it will detect the Manager's breaches with one-
hundred percent probability before the Sale Date, whereas if the Fund 
elects not to monitor, it will detect the Manager's breaches with zero 
percent probability before the Sale Date. 
The application of this analytical framework to breaches of rights of first 
refusal requires courts to undertake a fact-based inquiry into the post-
execution monitoring behavior of non-breaching parties.  When a court 
weighs the various legal remedies available to a non-breaching party, it 
should consider the reasonableness of that party's post-execution conduct.  
The costs that a party incurs in monitoring the breaching party's post-
execution (and pre-breach) behavior are a proxy for the reasonableness of a 
non-breaching party's conduct.  Using the facts of the Google hypothetical, 
the following sections consider the appropriate legal remedy when:  (1) the 
Fund's expected profits are greater than its monitoring costs, (2) the Fund's 
expected profits equal its monitoring costs and (3) the Fund's expected 
profits are less than its monitoring costs. 
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C. Monitoring Costs Theory as Applied to Varying Factual 
Circumstances Based on the Google Hypothetical 
As explained above, the pertinent facts of the Google hypothetical are as 
follows: (i) on the Execution Date, the Fund and the Manager entered into a 
contract pursuant to which the Fund had a right of participation of up to 
fifty percent in an investment opportunity to be identified by the Manager; 
(ii) between the Execution Date and the Sale Date, the Manager identified 
an opportunity and invested $5 million in Google (representing an eight 
percent ownership interest in the company); (iii) in breach of the right of 
first refusal, the Manager failed to present that opportunity to the Fund; and 
(iv) on the Sale Date, the Manager sold its investment in Google (post-IPO) 
for approximately $2 billion.  Whereas the expectancy formula discussed in 
Part III resolved the question of damages by determining the contract price 
and market value of the investment on the date of the breach, the 
monitoring costs regime approaches the issue of damages by analyzing the 
non-breaching party's post-execution monitoring costs. 
1. When expected profits exceed monitoring costs 
Consider first the situation where on the Execution Date, the Fund 
expects substantial profits on the investment opportunity.  Based on that 
valuation, the Fund (like any rational contracting party) will incur high 
monitoring costs after the Execution Date in an effort to maximize the 
opportunity to receive substantial profits.  If the Fund's expected profits on 
the investment opportunity are greater than the monitoring costs that the 
Fund elects to incur after the Execution Date, the Fund will discover the 
Manager's breach with one-hundred percent probability before the Sale 
Date according to the assumptions of the model set forth above.  Upon 
discovery of the breach, the Fund may seek either of the following legal 
remedies:  (1) the receipt of monetary damages in the amount of its 
monitoring costs; or (2) an award of specific performance whereby the 
Fund would buy into the investment opportunity up to its contractual fifty 
percent right of participation.236  As between the two remedies, the Fund 
                                                          
 236. This scenario contemplates the absence of fraud on the part of the Manager.  
Hypothetically, suppose expected profits are greater than monitoring costs, and the Fund 
monitored the Manager by inspecting and auditing the Manager's books, reviewing 
disclosures of venture capital-financed companies and engaging in ongoing discussions with 
the Manager regarding its “prospecting” activities.  Suppose further that the Manager 
misrepresented or concealed information relating to the Google investment opportunity, and 
in so doing, subverted the Fund's monitoring efforts such that the Fund did not bring a 
lawsuit until the Sale Date.  In either misrepresenting the fact of its investment in Google or 
concealing material information relating to the Google investment opportunity, the Manager 
would have committed fraud—a knowing misrepresentation of the truth, which occurs either 
by a reckless misrepresentation despite a disbelief of its truth or a concealment of a material 
fact to induce another person to act (or not act) in reliance on the concealment.  BLACK'S 
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would prefer the latter remedy because a recovery of monetary damages in 
the form of its sunk monitoring costs would be under-compensatory where 
the Fund's expected return exceeds its monitoring costs.  Ultimately, the 
timeliness (or lack thereof) of the Fund's detection of the breach would 
inform the court's determination of an appropriate remedy.237  The court's 
analysis of the timeliness of the Fund's discovery of the breach would 
depend on a number of factors, including the Manager's ability to deliver 
the contracted performance.238  Even before the Sale Date, the court might 
deny specific relief in the Google hypothetical due to the incongruity 
between the remedy and the circumstances at the time of the breach, as 
evidenced by the ascent in the value of the Google shares in the period 
between the Execution Date and the Sale Date.239 
2. When expected profits equal monitoring costs 
Consider next the scenario where on the Execution Date, the Fund 
expects that the costs it will incur in monitoring the contract will equal the 
expected return of the investment identified by the Manager.  Based on that 
valuation, the Fund will be indifferent as to monitoring or not monitoring.  
Assuming the Fund elects to monitor, the analysis would proceed as set 
forth in the prior section.  The Fund would discover the breach before the 
Sale Date and would elect between:  (1) the receipt of monetary damages in 
the amount of its monitoring costs; or (2) an award of specific performance 
whereby the Fund would buy into the investment opportunity up to its 
contractual fifty percent right of participation.  However, given that the 
Fund has monitored to the extent of its expected profits, it is likely, due to 
its preference for the opportunity to invest in Google, to select specific 
performance.  Assuming that the Fund elects not to monitor, its failure to 
                                                          
LAW DICTIONARY 670 (7th ed. 1999).  The Fund's failure to bring the lawsuit until the Sale 
Date would have indicated that expected profits were less than or equal to monitoring costs 
and that the Fund did not monitor.  However, the Fund's failure to bring the lawsuit until the 
Sale Date would have been excusable because of the circumstances of fraud surrounding its 
post-contract monitoring.  Thus, the theory of monitoring costs would support the Fund's 
recovery of monetary damages to the extent of the amount it expended on post-contract 
information collection and monitoring. 
 237. Specific performance typically is awarded in those instances where the good in 
question is unique.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359(1) (1981) (“Specific 
performance or an injunction will not be ordered if damages would be adequate to protect 
the expectation interest of the injured party.”).  However, even when the market for the good 
in question is scarce, a court may deny specific relief if a delay in litigation has caused the 
remedy to be incongruous with the circumstances as they existed at the time of the breach.  
See Narasimhan, supra note 157, at 69 (illustrating that a significant delay in litigation could 
render specific performance untenable). 
 238. See supra Part III.C.3 (discussing specific relief in relation to the timeliness of the 
detection of a breach and the effect on ensuing litigation). 
 239. See id. (providing the World Series example of how specific performance may be 
inappropriate if the time has lapsed to the extent that the court is no longer able to compel 
specific performance). 
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incur monitoring costs would mean that there is a zero percent probability 
that it will detect the Manager's breach until the Sale Date (under the 
assumptions of the model).  On the Sale Date, the Fund should receive zero 
monetary damages.  This remedial outcome is appropriate for two reasons.  
First, the Fund should not be compensated for costs it did not incur.  
Second, if the Fund's expected profits equaled its monitoring costs, the 
Fund would have made a zero profit on the investment (expected profits 
minus monitoring costs equals zero).  Thus, the remedial outcome of zero 
monetary damages would be consistent with the Fund's expectancy interest 
in the investment. 
3. When expected profits are less than monitoring costs 
Finally, consider the scenario where on the Execution Date, the Fund 
expects that the profits on the investment opportunity will be less than the 
costs it will incur in monitoring the contract.  Based on that valuation, the 
Fund (like any rational contracting party) will not monitor (its monitoring 
costs will be zero).  Under the assumptions of the model, the Fund's failure 
to invest in monitoring will result in its inability to detect the Manager's 
breach until the Sale Date.  On that date, the Fund should receive zero 
damages for the same reasons the Fund should receive zero damages when 
expected profits equal monitoring costs and the Fund elects not to monitor.  
The Fund's failure to incur monitoring costs would evidence its lack of a 
compensable expectancy interest in the investment.  In fact, if expected 
profits were less than monitoring costs, the Fund would have made a 
negative profit on the investment.  An award of zero monetary damages 
therefore would be appropriate given the Fund's lack of, and indeed 
negative, expectancy interest in the investment. 
4. Monitoring costs framework as applied to the Google hypothetical 
In the Google hypothetical, the Fund's failure to detect the Manager's 
breach until the Sale Date points to one of two possibilities:  either (1) the 
Fund's expected profits equaled its monitoring costs and the Fund elected 
not to monitor or (2) the Fund's expected profits were less than its 
monitoring costs and the Fund did not monitor.  Under either of these two 
scenarios, the monitoring costs framework indicates that the appropriate 
remedial outcome is zero damages.  As discussed in Part III, the application 
of the expectancy formula to the Google hypothetical would also result in 
zero damages for the Fund.  The legal outcome of the expectancy formula 
is consistent with and supported by the theory of monitoring costs.  Had the 
Fund expected a profit on the investment, it would have incurred 
monitoring costs in an amount up to its proportionate share of expected ex 
post profits.  In failing to monitor the Manager, however, the Fund 
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expressed its lack of any compensable expectancy interest in the 
investment.240 
The fact that the Manager sold the Google investment on the Sale Date 
for an extremely large profit should have no bearing on the remedial 
outcome of the Google hypothetical under either the expectancy formula 
for damages or the monitoring costs regime.  Both frameworks protect a 
non-breaching party's ex ante calculation of expected return on the 
Execution Date.  While the Google investment surpassed (by far) the 
Fund's ex ante expectation of the value of the investment opportunity both 
on the Execution Date and at any time before the Sale Date, neither the 
expectancy formula nor the monitoring costs framework permit recovery 
based on actual ex post outcomes.  Particularly with inherently risky 
investments such as venture capital investments, courts should be even 
more reluctant to consider actual ex post outcomes as a basis for damages.  
As sophisticated contracting parties, participants in venture capital finance 
appreciate the risks associated with investing in innovation-intensive, start-
up and early-stage enterprises.  To allow recovery for a breach of contract 
based on actual ex post profits is to accord to a non-breaching party an 
investment free of any risk of market downturn—a result inconsistent with 
the nature of venture capital investment.241 
Thus, the avoidance of opportunistic post-breach behavior in the form of 
the ex post “cherry picking” of successful investment opportunities 
provides a further justification for the remedial outcome of zero monetary 
damages where expected profits are less than or equal to monitoring costs 
and the investor elects not to monitor.  In Scully, the Third Circuit observed 
that by measuring damages from the date of the breach pursuant to the 
expectancy formula, the law endeavors to obviate incentives for such 
adverse post-breach behavior.242  To award recovery based on actual ex 
post profits (where the non-breaching party's expected profits were less 
than or equal to its monitoring costs and such party did not monitor) in 
opposition to the Scully Court's articulated preference for ex ante damages 
might incentivize “free-riding” by permitting non-breaching parties 
selectively to reap the gains of successful investments, while eschewing the 
losses of unsuccessful investments.  To minimize opportunistic post-breach 
behavior in the context of the Google hypothetical, the Fund's decision not 
                                                          
 240. Even in the unusual situation where the Fund has not monitored and yet still learns 
that the Manager has failed to present an opportunity before the Sale Date, the Fund should 
receive zero damages based on its expectancy interest as established by the amount ($0) it 
spent monitoring the Manager. 
 241. See Scully v. US WATS, Inc., 238 F.3d 497, 513 (3d Cir. 2001) (rejecting a 
plaintiff's after-the-fact assertion because it would minimize his risk and guarantee a profit 
in contrast to the risk and reality of a stock option). 
 242. Id. at 510. 
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to monitor either because its monitoring costs equaled or exceeded its 
expected profits should preclude the Fund from “cherry-picking” specific 
successful investment opportunities on an ex post basis.  According to both 
the expectancy formula for damages and the monitoring costs regime, the 
Fund's ex ante valuation of the Google investment as measured by the price 
the Fund would have paid for the investment or the costs the Fund would 
have incurred in monitoring the Manager, respectively, governs the 
appropriate measure of damages (not the actual ex post profits of the 
Google investment). 
The proposed framework offers a fact-based approach from which to 
consider breaches of rights of first refusal that is consistent with the 
existing legal regime of expectation damages because it protects ex ante 
expected profits and minimizes adverse post-breach behavior.  
Unconstrained by the prescribed methodology of the existing damages 
regime for breaches of stock or stock option agreements, the monitoring 
costs framework considers the post-execution monitoring behavior of the 
non-breaching party and determines the appropriate remedial outcome 
based on a measurable and identifiable proxy for expectation damages—the 
post-execution monitoring costs incurred by the non-breaching party. 
Notwithstanding the analytical and theoretical appeal of the monitoring 
costs framework, inherent limitations call into question the practicability of 
such a regime.  Most significantly, the model is based on a number of 
assumptions that are difficult to replicate in the real world—assumptions 
such as litigation costs being zero, the inherent certainty of the detection of 
breaches and calculations of expected profit remaining static over time.  In 
addition to these limitations, the fact-based nature of the framework may 
lead to excessive uncertainty with respect to the calculation of damages.  
To avoid the fact-based inquiries and uncertainty attendant to the 
monitoring costs framework, Part V considers the desirability and 
practicability of a liquidated damages regime for venture capital.  Part V 
begins by setting forth the current legal standards for liquidated damages 
clauses and then develops a legally supportable methodology upon which 
to formulate such a clause in the context of venture capital investment. 
V. A PROPOSAL FOR A LIQUIDATED DAMAGES CLAUSE AS AN 
ALTERNATIVE TO THE EXISTING REMEDIAL REGIME 
A. A Theoretical Framework for Liquidated Damages Clauses 
To the extent permitted by law, contracting parties may customize their 
liability by specifying damages in advance.243  Parties to a contract have the 
                                                          
 243. Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1401, 1437-38 (2005). 
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option to include in their agreement a provision that sets forth a monetary 
amount payable for loss they reasonably anticipate may be suffered by one 
of the parties in the event of a breach of contract.244  Such contractual 
provisions are commonly called liquidated damages clauses.245  Contract 
law reflects a dichotomy between enforceable liquidated damages clauses 
and unenforceable penalty clauses.246  While parties may elect to include an 
advanced stipulation of damages in their contracts, if the court construes 
the clause as unreasonable or supra-compensatory, the court will refuse to 
enforce the clause.247 
When reviewing a challenge to a liquidated damages clause, most courts 
examine whether the clause was the product of an honest effort by the 
parties to estimate reasonably the actual harm caused by the breach.248  If 
the clause reflects a reasonable estimate of loss that would be caused by a 
breach, the provision typically is upheld as an enforceable liquidated 
damages clause.249  If, on the other hand, the clause is designed to coerce 
contractual performance by punishing a party for its breach, courts will 
invalidate the clause as a matter of public policy, citing to the clause's 
                                                          
 244. Cheryl A. Davis, Note, Liquidated Damage Clauses, 1 TRANSACTIONS:  TENN. J. OF 
BUS. L. 32, 32 (1999). 
 245. Id. 
 246. Larry A. DiMatteo, A Theory of Efficient Penalty:  Eliminating the Law of 
Liquidated Damages, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 633, 635 (2001); see also Robert E. Scott & George 
G. Triantis, Embedded Options and the Case Against Compensation in Contract Law, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 1428, 1454 n.108 (2004) (noting that advance stipulations of damages were 
invalidated as penalties in thirty-seven percent of a sample of 109 federal and state appellate 
cases between January 1998 and January 2004 in which enforceability was at issue, further 
supporting why parties may be disincentivized from stipulating damages in advance).  The 
law against penalties emerged from the English courts of equity to limit the enforcement of 
penal bonds that were used to ensure a contractual performance. The penal nature of such 
bonds was considered inappropriate for redressing the harm resulting from a breach of 
contract.  5 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 293 (1924). 
 247. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 129, § 12.18, at 283 (noting that while contracting 
parties have extensive bargaining power, their power to stipulate damages in advance is 
surprisingly limited as courts may invalidate what they deem to be high money damages); 
see also DiMatteo, supra note 246, at 635 (analyzing why liquidates damages are given 
scrutiny so as not to subject a breaching party to a penalty); Paul Bennett Marrow, The 
Unconscionability of a Liquidated Damage Clause:  A Practical Application of Behavioral 
Decision Theory, 22 PACE L. REV. 27, 34-35 (2001) (explaining that an “overly sufficient” 
liquidated damages clause often becomes an unenforceable penalty); Ulen, supra note 64, at 
350 (stating that courts will not enforce a liquidated damages clause which appears to be 
punative).  For cases holding that a contractual provision represented a penalty, see Rye v. 
Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 315 N.E.2d 458, 459 (N.Y. 1974) (invalidating damages of $200 
per day up to $100,000 for delay in building a complex); Seeman v. Biemann, 84 N.W. 490, 
492-93 (Wis. 1900) (invalidating damages of $10 a day for delay in completing a building 
that had a rental value of $38 per month).  For cases upholding contractual provisions as 
liquidated damages clauses, see Banta v. Stamford Motor Co., 92 A. 665, 667-68 (Conn. 
1914) (finding reasonable $15 a day damages for failure to deliver $5,500 yacht); see also 
Dave Gustafson & Co. v. State, 156 N.W.2d 185, 186-89 (S.D. 1968) (finding reasonable 
$210 a day for delay in completing highway contract worth $530,742). 
 248. Davis, supra note 244, at 32. 
 249. Id. at 32-33. 
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punitive nature.250  It bears emphasis that courts will resolve doubts 
concerning the reasonableness of an advanced stipulation of damages in 
favor of finding a penalty in most cases.251 
The limited enforcement of liquidated damages clauses represents a 
long-recognized exception to freedom of contract.252  Professor Robert A. 
Hillman of Cornell Law School has noted the irony between the notion of 
freedom of contract and courts' reluctance to recognize the freedom of 
parties to contract for an advanced stipulation of damages, referring to the 
law of liquidated damages as the “great paradox in contract law.”253  Unless 
the stipulated damages clause meets certain requirements, courts typically 
will supplant the contracting parties' pre-agreed remedial response to a 
breach of contract with their own remedy.254  In light of the current judicial 
propensity not to enforce advanced stipulations of damages, the following 
section sets forth a number of arguments that support a less restrictive 
approach to the enforcement of liquidated damages clauses. 
B. The Practical Advantages of Liquidated Damages Clauses 
If courts uphold liquidated damages clauses, parties will accrue benefits 
throughout the three phases of contract:  formation, breach and 
enforcement.255  Allowing parties to specify the remedy for a breach during 
                                                          
 250. Id. at 33.  There is a split of authority regarding whether courts should use a 
prospective approach or retrospective approach, or both, to evaluate the reasonableness of 
an advance stipulation of damages.  Id.  Under the prospective method, courts consider 
whether the stipulated damages reflect a reasonable estimate of potential loss and whether 
actual loss was indeterminable or difficult to measure at the time of the execution of the 
contract.  Id.  When an advance stipulation of damages satisfies those two requirements, 
then the provision will be enforceable as a liquidated damages clause.  Id.  Under the 
prospective analysis, the actual harm suffered by the non-breaching party is immaterial to 
granting recovery.  Id.  However, a court may invalidate an advance stipulation of damages 
if it is 'grossly disproportionate' to the actual damages suffered by the non-breaching party.  
Id.; see Beasley v. Horrell, 864 S.W.2d 45, 48-49 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (invalidating the 
cancellation provision of a contract because it was not in the amount of estimated damages; 
rather it was punitive because it called for an amount that far exceeded the actual damages at 
the time of the breach), overruled by Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc., 955 S.W.2d 88, 100 (Tenn. 
1999).  The difference between the prospective and retrospective approaches is timing:  
whether the reasonableness of the advance stipulation of damages is evaluated from the 
perspective of the parties at the time of the execution of the contract or after the breach 
occurred.  Davis, supra note 244, at 33. 
 251. See Davis, supra note 244, at 42 (emphasizing that courts in Tennessee use the 
default rule of finding in favor of a penalty when determining the validity of stipulated 
damages). 
 252. DiMatteo, supra note 246, at 634-35. 
 253. See id. at 638 (“Ironically, courts have voided liquidated damages clauses under the 
banner of intentionality—namely that one of the parties did not intend to liquidate damages 
despite the existence of an express term stating otherwise.”). 
 254. Id. 
 255. James Arthur Weisfield, Note, “Keep the Change!”:  A Critique of the No Actual 
Injury Defense to Liquidated Damages—Lind Building Corp. v. Pacific Bellevue 
Developments, 55 Wash. App. 70, 776 P.2d 977 (Div. 1), review denied, 113 Wash. 2d 
1021, 781 P.2d 1322 (1989), 65 WASH. L. REV. 977, 978 (1990). 
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contract formation enables them to allocate risks in three significant 
ways.256  First, as a result of the negotiations, the contracting parties assess 
the nature and scope of harm caused by a breach, which enables them to 
weigh the costs of breach against the gains of contractual performance.257  
To avoid excessive risk, parties should negotiate for more favorable terms 
before accepting liability.258  For example, during contract negotiations, the 
Manager in the Google hypothetical might seek a higher management fee 
in exchange for the assumption of liability.  Second, the process and result 
of these negotiations help promisees identify reliable promisors with whom 
to contract.259  By agreeing to liquidate damages, promisors may enhance 
their credibility (and reputational value) in the industry in which they 
operate.  Finally, advanced stipulations of damages enable parties to reduce 
the risk of under-compensation, particularly when ordinary legal measures 
are inadequate.260 
Liquidated damages clauses also help parties evaluate the efficiency of a 
breach.  The theory of efficient breach maintains that, all other factors 
being equal, parties should breach contracts when the expected costs of a 
breach are less than the expected gains of performance.261  The uncertainty 
of litigation complicates the calculus for an efficient breach.262  However, 
when a liquidated damages clause is enforceable, the cost of a breach is 
fixed and the parties may identify more accurately when a breach becomes 
efficient.263 
Furthermore, the enforcement of liquidated damages clauses enables 
parties to avoid the risks of litigation.264  At a minimum, such clauses may 
encourage the contracting parties to settle their dispute before trial.265  In 
addition to saving the parties the expense and delay of litigating complex 
damages issues, the enforcement of the parties' pre-determined remedial 
response to a breach allows them to avoid the uncertainties attendant to ex 
                                                          
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Weisfield, supra note 255, at 979. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id.  Some commentators contend that the enforcement of liquidated damages 
clauses whose sums substantially exceed actual damages create adverse incentives for the 
inducement of breach.  See Kenneth W. Clarkson et al., Liquidated Damages v. Penalties:  
Sense or Nonsense?, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 351, 368-69 (using an example of a bridge 
construction with a stipulated damage clause of $500 a day for each day that the bridge is 
delayed beyond a specific date, authors illustrate how the amount of the clause, the amount 
of actual damages and the legal posture towards stipulated damages change incentives for 
breach inducement). 
 264. See DiMatteo, supra note 246, at 634 (stating that parties generally draft liquidated 
damages clauses with the hopes of avoiding litigation). 
 265. Id. 
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post remedies fashioned by courts.266  The certainty of a liquidated 
damages clause affords protection to both parties to a contract—protection 
to the promisee from damages caused by unsatisfactory performance or 
non-performance (where the indeterminate nature of a loss would make 
proof of loss difficult) and assurance to the promisor that her liability is 
both defined and limited in the event that she breaches the contract.267  The 
avoidance of uncertainty should be of particular significance to contracting 
parties in the venture capital context where the uncertainties surrounding 
the financing of innovation-intensive firms may make damages 
indeterminate or difficult to prove. 
The following section endeavors to develop a methodology upon which 
to formulate a legally supportable liquidated damages clause for breaches 
of rights of first refusal in the venture capital context.268 
C. Proposed Methodology for the Formulation of a Liquidated Damages 
Clause for Breaches of Rights of First Refusal in the Venture Capital 
Context 
The substantive terms of the right of first refusal should inform the 
methodology that the parties use to formulate a liquidated damages clause 
for the breach of such a right.  The parties should structure the liquidated 
damages clause to approximate the profits gained by the breaching party 
(i.e., up to, but not exceeding, the percentage contractual right of 
participation allocated to the non-breaching party).  This regime best can be 
understood by referring back to the Google hypothetical.  The right of first 
refusal at issue in the Google hypothetical provided that during the stated 
term of the contract the Fund had the opportunity to participate in up to 
fifty percent of the Manager's investments.  Under the proposed 
framework, the liquidated damages clause should specify that if the 
Manager breaches the Fund's right of first refusal, the Manager would pay 
the Fund damages in the amount of the profits gained by the Manager (up 
to fifty percent—the maximum percentage the Fund was contractually 
allowed to invest) in the investment(s) it failed to present to the Fund, 
measured from the date of the lawsuit or the date on which the Manager 
sold the investment, whichever is earlier. 
Whether the liquidated damages clause should permit the Fund to 
receive the full fifty percent of the profits of each investment opportunity 
that the Manager failed to present is an interesting question.  Because the 
Fund may not have elected to invest to the extent of its full fifty percent 
                                                          
 266. Davis, supra note 244, at 32. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Underlying any proposed liquidated damages regime is the fundamental assumption 
that the contracting parties will agree to stipulate damages in advance. 
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contractual right of participation, if at all, the proposed methodology sets 
the allocable percentage of participation (fifty percent) as the upper 
threshold for profits.  The parties may, of course, negotiate for a percentage 
lower than fifty percent.  If the Fund and Manager have had no prior 
transactional history, during contract negotiations, the parties must 
determine an appropriate limit on profits up to, but not exceeding, the fifty 
percent threshold.  On the other hand, if the parties have had a transactional 
history, they may elect to base the percentage threshold of the liquidated 
damages clause on the prior average of amounts invested by the Fund in 
investment opportunities identified by the Manager.  Suppose, for instance, 
that the Fund had participated in four prior investments with the Manager.  
For each of those transactions, the Fund, pursuant to a right of first refusal, 
could invest in the opportunity up to fifty percent of the amounts invested 
by the Manager.  If the Fund had invested forty, ten, twenty and ten percent 
of the amounts invested by the Manager in each of the four investments, 
respectively, the prior average of amounts invested by the Fund in 
identified investment opportunities is twenty percent.  Under this factual 
scenario, the liquidated damages clause between the Fund and the Manager 
should stipulate that the Fund is entitled to damages in the amount of 
twenty percent of the profits earned by the Manager in the investment(s) it 
failed to present to the Fund (as measured from the date of the lawsuit or 
the date on which the Manager sold the investment, whichever is earlier). 
Notwithstanding its practical and theoretical appeal, a liquidated 
damages regime has some inherent limitations.  Perhaps the most 
significant limitation is the disincentive for promisors to agree to damages 
in advance.  As a general proposition, sophisticated contracting parties 
prefer not to stipulate damages in advance and instead opt to rely on the 
courts to apply an appropriate remedy.  While the potential signal of 
unreliability (and accompanying reputational damage) that a refusal to 
agree to liquidated damages might send to industry participants mitigates 
against existing disincentives, the omission of liquidated damages clauses 
from venture capital contracts points to the continued potency of these 
disincentives.269  However, the practical advantages of liquidated damages 
clauses identified in the prior section should outweigh promisor 
disincentives, particularly in the venture capital context where the nature of 
investment results in high uncertainty regarding damages outcomes for a 
breach of contract.  By protecting the contracting parties' pre-agreed 
remedial response to a breach, and in so doing, supplanting a remedy that 
otherwise would be fashioned by a court ex post, a liquidated damages 
                                                          
 269. See Schell, supra note 55, at App. E (providing a sample standard Investment 
Management Agreement which contains no liquidated damages provision). 
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regime avoids the fact-based inquiries and related uncertainty attendant to 
judicial remedies.  In addition to the practical advantages of a liquidated 
damages regime, the proposed methodology for the formulation of a 
liquidated damages clause for the breach of a right of first refusal results in 
a damages award that reflects the actual profits of a non-breaching party 
had there been no breach.  This measure of recovery is neither over- nor 
under-compensatory and likely would satisfy the reasonableness standards 
of the law of liquidated damages.  Thus, liquidated damages clauses offer a 
desirable alternative to the existing judicial remedies and should become 
standard in venture capital co-investment agreements. 
CONCLUSION 
There is currently a gaping hole in the law regarding the manner in 
which damages should be measured in cases involving breaches of rights of 
first refusal in venture capital.  As the venture capital market matures and 
with the diminished efficacy of reputation as an enforcement mechanism, 
litigation will increase, making the resolution of the damages issue raised 
in this Article particularly salient.  Existing law governing breaches of 
stock option agreements points to the applicability of substitutional relief 
theory, and in particular expectancy damages, to the facts of the Google 
hypothetical and offers a legally supportable outcome under those facts.  In 
addition to analyzing existing law, this Article developed an agency theory 
of monitoring costs from which to consider breaches of rights of first 
refusal.  Beyond providing support for the remedial outcome of the Google 
hypothetical under existing law, the monitoring costs framework offers an 
innovative approach for the consideration of breaches of rights of first 
refusal under varying factual circumstances.  Despite the analytical and 
theoretical appeal of the monitoring costs framework, inherent limitations, 
particularly the difficulty of replicating in the real world some of the 
assumptions of the monitoring costs model, call into question the 
practicability of such a regime. 
Therefore, as an alternative to the existing judicial remedies and the 
monitoring costs framework, this Article considered the desirability and 
practicability of a liquidated damages regime for venture capital.  
Recognizing the desirability and practicability of such a regime, this Article 
concludes that liquidated damages clauses should become standard in 
venture capital co-investment agreements.  Finally, the proposed 
methodology for the formulation of a liquidated damages clause is both 
consistent with the legal standards for such clauses and appropriate for use 
in the context of venture capital investment. 
